University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

2006

A Certain Mongrel Court: Congress's Past Power
and Present Potential to Reinforce the Supreme
Court
Ross E. Davies

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Davies, Ross E., "A Certain Mongrel Court: Congress's Past Power and Present Potential to Reinforce the Supreme Court" (2006).
Minnesota Law Review. 13.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/13

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

DAVIES_3FMT

01/23/2006 04:25:30 PM

Article

A Certain Mongrel Court:
Congress’s Past Power and Present
Potential To Reinforce the Supreme Court
Ross E. Davies†
“Although a Supreme Court is provided for by the Constitution,
the organization of the existing Court rests on an act of
Congress.” 1
What can be done to keep the doors of the Supreme Court
open if the death or incapacitation of several Justices (as a result of, say, a terrorist attack) deprives it of a quorum?2 There
is a tendency to assume—somewhat mistakenly, as this Article
will show—that Congress has little or no power to address this
problem head-on. This assumption is rooted in the constitutional mandate that “[t]he judicial Power of the United States,
† Associate Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law;
Editor-in-Chief, the Green Bag. Thanks to Vikram Amar, Michelle Boardman,
Ofemi Cadmus, Lloyd Cohen, Mike Davies, Susan Davies, Steven Duffield,
Robert Ellis, Patricia Evans, Andrew Finch, Curtis Gannon, Gregory Jacob,
Bruce Johnsen, Bruce Kobayashi, Eugene Kontorovich, Montgomery Kosma,
Michael Krauss, Craig Lerner, Nelson Lund, Ira Brad Matetsky, Stephen
McAllister, Suzanna Sherry, Ilya Somin, Amy Steacy, Mark Tushnet, participants in a Robert A. Levy Fellow Workshop, the George Mason Law & Economics Center, and the Critical Infrastructure Protection Program at the
George Mason University School of Law.
1. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY
209 (Harold W. Chase & Craig R. Ducat eds., 14th ed. 1978).
2. See generally Continuity of Gov’t Comm’n, The Continuity of Government
Commission
Meeting
(Sept.
23,
2002),
http://www
.continuityofgovernment.org/pdfs/020923transcript.pdf. Reducing the quorum
(currently six, 28 U.S.C. § 1 (2000)) would not answer the question. It would
merely narrow the problem to the death or incapacitation of most or all of the
Justices. Moreover, for purposes of this Article, a quorum reduction probably
does not amount to much of a narrowing, because if terrorists or some other
villains target the Supreme Court they will almost certainly attack when the
Justices are in one place, and thus not, for example, during the Court’s recess
from early July to late September, when they tend to scatter.
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shall be vested in one supreme Court,” and a reading of those
terms and their history that precludes legislation creating some
sort of back-up Court.3
First, the text: The word “one” in “one supreme Court” is
read to mean “one [indivisible].” As Chief Justice Morrison R.
Waite expressed it,
I beg you to note this language: “ONE SUPREME COURT and such inferior courts as Congress MAY, FROM TIME TO TIME, ordain and establish.” Not a Supreme Court or Supreme Courts, but “ONE,” and ONLY
ONE. This one Supreme Court Congress cannot abolish, neither can it
create another. Upon this the Constitution has no doubtful meaning.
There must be one, and but one. Certainly such a provision, in such
pointed language, carries with it the strongest implication that when
this court acts, it must act as an entirety, and that its judgments
shall be the judgments of the court sitting judicially as one court and
not as several courts.4

And second, the history: It is simply understood that Congress’s implementation of the “one supreme Court” language
has never involved a reorganization of the Court under which
some Justice or Justices conducted the Court’s business while
others qualified to serve were compelled to watch from the sidelines.5
3. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (emphasis added); see, e.g., Randolph Moss &
Edward N. Siskel, The Least Vulnerable Branch, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 1015,
1044–47 (2004); Continuity of Gov’t Comm’n, supra note 2 (statement of
James C. Duff).
4. Morrison R. Waite, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Speech of
Chief-Justice Waite (Sept. 15, 1887), in BREAKFAST TO THE JUSTICES OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 18, 19 (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott
Co. 1888); see also, e.g., DEBATES IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, ON
THE BILL FOR REPEALING THE LAW “FOR THE MORE CONVENIENT ORGANIZATION OF THE COURT OF THE UNITED STATES;” DURING THE FIRST SESSION OF
THE SEVENTH CONGRESS, AND A LIST OF THE YEAS AND NAYS ON THAT INTERESTING SUBJECT 104 (Albany, Whiting, Leavenworth, & Whiting 1802)
(statement of Sen. Gouverneur Morris) (“The constitution says, the judicial
power shall be vested in one supreme court, and in inferior courts. The legislature can therefore only organize one supreme court, but they may establish as
many inferior courts as they shall think proper.”).
5. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court,
Congress and Federal Jurisdiction, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 44 n.222 (1990) (debating the merits of a multipaneled Court, while noting the more than two
hundred–year history of the Supreme Court in its current form); Daniel J.
Meltzer, The History and Structure of Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1569,
1614–19 (1990) (discussing the Founders’ apparent expectation that the Supreme Court would exercise appellate jurisdiction over inferior courts); see
also, e.g., Stephen J. Field, Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, The Centenary of the Supreme Court (Feb. 4, 1890), in HAMPTON L. CARSON, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS HISTORY AND ITS CENTENNIAL
CELEBRATION 698, 713 (Philadelphia, John Y. Huber Co. 1891) (“No case in
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Part I of this Article shows that the “one [indivisible]” reading of the text is correct. A review of the development of the
Constitution’s “one supreme Court” language reveals that the
Framers did indeed read “one supreme Court” to mean “one
[indivisible] supreme Court”—a single body consisting of all of
its available and qualified members to conduct its business.
That reading has persisted in the overwhelming majority of expert commentary from all three branches of the federal government and academia down to the present day.
But Part II reveals a conflict between the verbal expression
and the actual implementation of the Constitution’s “one supreme Court” language: the historical belief in perfect congressional perpetuation of the “one [indivisible] supreme Court” is
mistaken. Early Congresses did not treat the constitutional
commitment to “one supreme Court” as an absolute bar to all
subdivision of the structure and business of the Court. And the
Supreme Court itself went along with the legislature. Part II.A
chronicles an instructive instance of this behavior in the early
Republic: the creation in 1802 of a one-Justice rump Supreme
Court that sat on the first Monday of August until 1839.6 Part
II.B describes the operation of the August Term rump Court,
its relationship to the conventional February Term en banc
Court,7 and its eventual demise on nonconstitutional grounds.8
Part III attempts to reconcile the constitutional provision
of “one [indivisible] supreme Court” with the congressional organization of the Court into a one-Justice rump and the more
familiar en banc body, and to divine from the rump-Court experience some sense of the scope of Congress’s past power and
present potential to fiddle with the structure of the Supreme
Court. The result is a set of three requirements that any statute must satisfy:
(1) Preserve involvement of active Justices in deciding
cases;
(2) Preserve the functionally indivisible Court; and
(3) Eschew compulsory participation by any Justice in
anything other than the conventional en banc Court.
the Supreme Court is ever referred to any one Justice, or to several of the Justices, to decide and report to the others.”).
6. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 31, § 2, 2 Stat. 156, 156, repealed by Act of
Feb. 28, 1839, ch. 36, § 7, 5 Stat. 321, 322.
7. Id. § 1, 2 Stat. at 156. In 1826 Congress changed the February Term
to a January Term. Act of May 4, 1826, ch. 37, 4 Stat. 160.
8. Act of Feb. 28, 1839 § 7.
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Drawing on that experience and applying these three requirements, Parts III.A and B offer two novel examples of the
forms congressional action might take, with an eye to improving continuity of Supreme Court operations in the face of calamity. None of this should be taken to mean that Congress
should exercise whatever power it may have to change the
structure of the Supreme Court in the service of continuity of
government. (Careful congressional study may reveal that the
best course of legislative action is no action at all.)9 But it does
mean that a decision to abandon consideration of legislative
approaches should not be based on a presumption of complete,
uninterrupted, and constitutionally-compelled congressional
impotence in this area.
Before moving on to the history of “one supreme Court,” be
clear about what this Article is and what it is not. It is not a
contribution to the ancient and polyphonous jurisdictionstripping debate, meaning the assertion and denial of capacities in the states and in the other branches of the federal government to restrict or avoid the reach of the Court.10 It is, instead, a small addition to the relatively sparse study of Justicestripping, meaning the assertion and denial of capacities within
the federal government to restrict participation by Justices in
work that is within the Court’s jurisdiction.11
In addition, this Article is predicated on the idea that the
United States is better-off with a Supreme Court than without
one, even for a short time. On the one hand, it is certainly true
that lower courts would continue to resolve most cases within
federal jurisdiction without any need for Supreme Court involvement, even during a national crisis involving the decapita9. See Continuity of Gov’t Comm’n, supra note 2 (statement of James C.
Duff).
10. See, e.g., Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003); Ex parte
McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868); Lloyd C. Anderson, Congressional Control over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: A New Threat to James Madison’s Compromise, 39 BRANDEIS L.J. 417 (2000); William W. Van Alstyne, A
Critical Guide to Ex parte McCardle, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 229 (1973); see also T.R.
Goldman, Full-Court Pressure: Congress Pushed Federal Judges to Save Terri
Schiavo, but They Wouldn’t Go Along, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 28, 2005, at 1.
11. The related question of when restrictions on the Justices become unconstitutional encroachments on their right to “hold their Offices during good
Behaviour,” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, is beyond the scope of this Article. Laws
already on the books beg the question. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 3, 42–43 (2000)
(addressing the contingency of a vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice due
to disability, the allotment of Supreme Court Justices to circuits, and the composition of the circuits, respectively).
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tion of the U.S. government.12 On the other hand, however,
there are good reasons to have a Supreme Court in place, some
of which would be especially important during just such a crisis, including: (1) settling intra- and inter-branch disputes triggered by whatever disaster affects the Court itself;13 (2) promoting a sense of national stability domestically;14 and (3)
12. See, e.g., Charles Lane, After Sept. 11, Judiciary Rethinks the Unthinkable: Judges Confident of Continuity, but Not Security, WASH. POST, Apr.
12, 2002, at A29 (“‘All . . . district and circuit judges . . . can issue writs under
the All Writs Act. So we are already dispersed nationwide.’” (quoting Justice
Anthony Kennedy)); Continuity of Gov’t Comm’n, supra note 2 (statement of J.
Robert A. Katzmann) (“The Federal Judiciary, unlike the other branches of
government, is dispersed across the nation and so it does not confront the
same kinds of issues . . . .”).
13. See, e.g., CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, PRESERVING OUR INSTITUTIONS: THE CONTINUITY OF CONGRESS 2 (2003), available at http://www
.continuityofgovernment.org/pdfs/FirstReport.pdf [hereinafter CONTINUITY OF
GOV’T COMM’N, REPORT]. The report states:
The confusion might very well lead to a conflict over who would be
president, Speaker of the House, or commander in chief, and a cloud
of illegitimacy would likely hang over all government action. The institution that might resolve such disputes is the Supreme Court.
However, it is likely that the entire Court would be killed in such an
attack, leaving no final tribunal to appeal to for answers to questions
about succession and legislative and executive action.
Id. The report continues: “If such a case arose during a national crisis involving, for example, separation of powers issues or presidential succession issues,
the Supreme Court might be needed to make a prompt ruling. Thus, the continuity of the Supreme Court during a period of crisis also deserves attention.”
Id. at 5; see also Norman J. Ornstein, Unprepared: Why Inauguration Day Is
Dangerous, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 17, 2005, at 15, 15–16; Continuity of Gov’t
Comm’n, Hearing on Potential Reforms to the Presidential Succession System
(Oct.
27,
2002),
http://www.continuityofgovernment.org/pdfs/
1027AEItranscript.pdf [hereinafter Continuity of Gov’t Comm’n, Hearing]
(statements of Rep. Brian Baird & Norman J. Ornstein, American Enterprise
Institute). Justices and the Court have served in similar capacities in the past.
See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000) (per curiam) (presidential election dispute); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 669–74 (1981) (presidential power to nullify private claims against foreign governments); United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974) (judicial process versus executive
privilege); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam) (freedom of press versus national security); Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582–89 (1952) (presidential encroachment on private sector absent statutory authorization); Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 154, 155
(1952) (per curiam) (political parties’ conformity pledge of electors); Marks v.
Davis, 4 Rapp 1413, 1413–14 (1912) (Van Devanter & Pitney, JJ., in chambers) (state electoral dispute); 7 CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: FIVE JUSTICES AND THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION OF 1877 passim (Supp. 1988) (presidential election dispute); infra note
133 (describing the Holtzman v. Schlesinger litigation).
14. See, e.g., CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, REPORT, supra note 13, at 5;
Continuity of Gov’t Comm’n, supra note 2 (statement of James C. Duff).
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presenting an image of national durability and strength internationally.15 “So having a Supreme Court in place in this age of
terrorism, or a final court of judgment, as quickly as possible is,
in fact, something meaningful . . . .”16 Moreover, having a “final
court of judgment” other than the Supreme Court would in all
likelihood be an ineffective less-than-half measure. Even if
Congress purported to create by statute some sort of temporary
emergency “final court of judgment,”17 such a court, being
something other than the Supreme Court, “might not carry the
weight of authority that might be needed for such an urgent
constitutional crisis or an issue that requires such resolution.”18
Furthermore, any “final court of judgment” that was not the
Supreme Court would be an “inferior court” whose decisions
would “provide no more finality of decisions than would a currently existing Court of Appeals.”19 Finally, we should expect
extraordinary cooperation among our nation’s political leaders
in a time of crisis (including speedy replacement of needed Supreme Court justices), and a failure of collaborative spirit at
such a time would signal governmental problems more urgent
than a temporary loss of the Supreme Court. But in any case,
conscientious preparation with an eye to reducing the strain on
political leadership at such a time could improve the chances
for successful collaboration in areas where preparation is impossible or unsuccessful. Thus, it would be best to have a Supreme-Court-in-a-can, ready to go if disaster strikes. The question, then, is whether Congress can create one.20
15. See, e.g., Continuity of Gov’t Comm’n, Hearing, supra note 13 (statement of Rep. Brian Baird).
16. Id. (statement of Norman Ornstein).
17. An impossible task for some kinds of disputes. See, e.g., U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (granting the Supreme Court original jurisdiction in certain
cases).
18. Continuity of Gov’t Comm’n, supra note 2 (statement of James C.
Duff).
19. Id.
20. It has been reported that the Supreme Court has its own “closely
guarded” secret continuity plan, see Lane, supra note 12, but whatever provisions such a plan may make for protecting members of the Court who survive
a catastrophe or for preserving the administrative systems of the Court, it
cannot lawfully provide for filling seats on the Court. That power belongs to
the President and Congress. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. At most, the Justices may
have collectively ratified, in advance, an extraordinary exertion of judicial
power by any of their number on an emergency basis—perhaps some variant
of the “rule of necessity” that would permit less than a quorum of the Court to
deal with cases requiring decision during a crisis. Cf. United States v. Will,
449 U.S. 200, 213–16 (1980) (explaining that under the “rule of necessity,” a
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I. THE “ONE SUPREME COURT”
National commitment to a single court of last resort dates
from the first days of the framing of the Constitution. The
ninth “Resolve” in the “Virginia Plan” presented at the opening
of the Philadelphia convention in late May 1787 provided that
“a National Judiciary be established to consist of one or more
supreme tribunals, and of inferior tribunals to be chosen by the
National Legislature.”21 The convention, working through the
Virginia Plan from front to back, arrived at the ninth Resolve
on Monday, June 4:
It was then moved and seconded to proceed to the consideration of
the 9th resolution submitted by Mr[.] Randolph[.] When on motion to
agree to the first clause[,] namely “resolved that a national judiciary
be established[,]” it passed in the affirmative[.]
It was then moved and seconded to add these words to the first
clause of the ninth resolution[,] namely “to consist of One supreme
tribunal, and of one or more inferior tribunals.[”] [A]nd on the question to agree to the same. [I]t passed in the affirmative.22

With the convention’s acceptance of the “One supreme tribunal” amendment, discussion of Virginia’s proposal for “one or
more supreme tribunals” disappeared from the convention’s deliberations.23 Thereafter, the national court of last resort was
judge may hear a case in which he or she has a personal interest, despite impartiality concerns, if no other judge has jurisdiction, such as when a statute
affects the Compensation Clause of Article III). But even that questionable
approach could not reach the situation in which all nine members of the Court
are killed or incapacitated. See supra note 2.
21. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 21 (Max
Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter RECORDS] (emphasis added).
22. Id. at 95 (emphasis added); see also id. at 104–05 (noting that the motion to add the words “to consist of one supreme tribunal, and of one or more
inferior tribunals” to the resolution passed in the affirmative).
23. Whether the objective of fixing the maximum number of supreme
courts at one was to reduce or enhance the power of the judiciary is not clear
from the record. It might have been part of a campaign to minimize the power
of the federal courts. See, e.g., David E. Engdahl, What’s in a Name? The Constitutionality of Multiple “Supreme” Courts, 66 IND. L.J. 457, 465 (1991) (“It
seems . . . that this wording change . . . is better viewed as the first of several
parliamentary steps by the delegates who maintained that all litigation should
begin (and ordinarily end) in state courts, with only a single national tribunal
to review certain classes of cases.”); James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan,
“Some Effectual Power”: The Quantity and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 696, 715 (1998). Or it could
have been a step toward maximizing the supervisory power of the national
court of last resort. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, Equity and
Hierarchy, 102 YALE L.J. 255, 274 (1992); James E. Pfander, JurisdictionStripping and the Supreme Court’s Power to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78
TEX. L. REV. 1433, 1452–53 (2000).
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invariably referred to in the singular and almost always as the
“one supreme” court or tribunal.24
But the words “one supreme” do not by themselves preclude the division of such a court into individual justices or
panels of justices to conduct portions of the court’s business.
The existence of one and only one United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, for example, does not
preclude the creation of multiple divisions of that court to sit in
panels and decide cases independently of each other.25 It might
be reasonable to infer—from the early, undisputed, and apparently unanimous replacement of “one or more supreme tribunals” with “One supreme tribunal”—some sort of understanding that the Supreme Court was to sit only as one body in its
entirety, but it would be better if there were something more
concrete to rely on. There is, as follows.
The question of compensation for federal judges came up
for debate at the constitutional convention on July 18, 1787. At
that point the proposed language provided that the judges were
“to receive punctually, at stated times, a fixed compensation for
their services; in which no encrease or diminution shall be
made.”26 Gouverneur Morris—a delegate representing Pennsylvania who was soon to be the leader of the convention’s Committee of Style and one of the most influential figures in the ultimate formulation of the language of the Constitution—moved
to strike the prohibition on increasing judicial salaries on the
ground that “the Legislature ought to be at liberty to increase
salaries as circumstances might require.”27 Benjamin Franklin,
in support of the motion, offered an example: “the business of
the [judicial] department may increase as the Country becomes
more populous.”28
James Madison opposed Morris’s motion on the ground
that the power to grant or withhold raises would give Congress
an inappropriate capacity to influence judicial behavior.29 And
he rebutted Franklin’s comment with the sensible suggestion
24. See, e.g., 1 RECORDS, supra note 21 passim; 2 id. passim. The competing “New Jersey Plan,” presented on June 15, 1787, featured “a supreme”
court. 1 id. at 244 (emphasis added).
25. 28 U.S.C. §§ 44, 46 (2000) (dividing the circuit courts into panels).
26. 1 RECORDS, supra note 21, at 226.
27. 2 id. at 38, 44; see also Charles Gardner Geyh & Emily Field Van Tassel, The Independence of the Judicial Branch in the New Republic, 74 CHI.KENT L. REV. 31, 42–43 (1998).
28. 2 RECORDS, supra note 21, at 44–45.
29. Id. at 45.
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that “[t]he increase of business will be provided for by an increase of the number who are to do it.”30 Morris and Franklin
had no answer to Madison’s solution to the problem of increasing caseloads,31 except with respect to the Supreme Court. “The
increase of business can not be provided for in the supreme tribunal in the way that has been mentioned [by Madison],” Morris explained, because “[a]ll the business of a certain description whether more or less must be done in that single
tribunal—Additional labor alone in the Judges can provide for
additional business. Additional compensation therefore ought
not to be prohibited.”32 In other words, because the work of the
Supreme Court could not be divided up among the members of
the Court, adding Justices would only add to the number of
people involved in each decision and every other piece of Court
business. No one, including Madison, disagreed with Morris’s
telling riposte. There being apparently no interest in establishing separate compensation systems for the Supreme Court and
for the rest of the federal judiciary, Morris’s motion passed.33
Later in the convention Madison and others tried to re-insert
the bar on increases in judicial salaries—a campaign that Morris successfully “opposed . . . for reasons urged by him on a former occasion.”34 The Constitution in its final form permitted
raises for sitting federal judges.35
The “one supreme Court” question was never again an issue in the framing or ratification of the Constitution,36 or in its
implementation in the Congresses of the 1790s. Thus, in a contentious period of constitutional formation and thoroughgoing
interpretation of many provisions of the new national charter,37

30. Id.
31. Madison’s solution is, in fact, a method commonly used to deal with
rising workloads at the trial and intermediate levels of the federal judiciary.
See Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028, 1046 & n.10 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (per curiam) (noting that Madison’s prophecy “has generally been borne out though
unevenly”).
32. 2 RECORDS, supra note 21, at 45.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 429–30.
35. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
36. See, e.g., Luther Martin, Md. Att’y Gen., Genuine Information, Address Before the Legislature of the State of Maryland (Nov. 29, 1787), reprinted in 3 RECORDS, supra note 21, app. A, CLVIII, at 172, 220.
37. See generally DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE
FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789–1801 (1997); STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITTRICK,
THE AGE OF FEDERALISM (1993).
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there seems to have been little doubt among the key players
that the Constitution should, and then did, specify one and not
more than one indivisible Supreme Court—meaning one body
collectively deciding all of the cases that came before it and
over which it had jurisdiction.38 The sentiments of the Framers—seemingly echoed in the comments of Chief Justice Waite
on the centennial of the Constitution39—have been consistently
shared by almost all judges, bureaucrats, and scholars ever
since.40

38. This understanding did not deter early Congresses from piling additional duties, judicial and otherwise, onto members of the Court. Nor, for that
matter, has it deterred modern Congresses from doing the same. Ross E. Davies, William Cushing, Chief Justice of the United States, 37 U. TOL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 55–57, on file with author).
39. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
40. See, e.g., Letter from Chief Justice Charles E. Hughes to Senator Burton K. Wheeler (Mar. 21, 1937), in SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REORGANIZATION OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, S. REP. NO. 75-711 app. C, at 40
(1937) (“I may also call attention to the provisions of article III, section 1, of
the Constitution that the judicial power of the United States shall be vested ‘in
one Supreme Court’ . . . . The Constitution does not appear to authorize two or
more Supreme Courts or two or more parts of a supreme court functioning in
effect as separate courts.”); see also, e.g., Caleb Cushing, Analysis of the Existing Constitution of the Judicial System of the United States, and Suggestion of
Desirable Modifications Thereof, 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 271, 277 (1854); Paul A.
Freund, Why We Need the National Court of Appeals, 59 A.B.A. J. 247, 249–50
(1973); Report of the Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court, 57
F.R.D. 573, 583 (1973); Retired Chief Justice Warren Attacks, Chief Justice
Burger Defends Freund Study Group’s Composition and Proposal, 59 A.B.A. J.
721, 729–30 (1973). But see CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864–88,
PART TWO 770 (1987) (discussing Justice Stephen J. Field’s support for an
enlarged and panelized Supreme Court); Tony Mauro, Profs Pitch Plan for
Limits on Supreme Court Service, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 3, 2005, at 1 (describing
a proposal by Professors Paul Carrington and Roger Cramton to establish
mandatory senior status for Justices who have served for a long time—a construct that would surely fail at least the third prong of the test proposed in
this Article for constitutionality of restrictions on the “one supreme Court”).
Byron R. White and Akhil Amar have suggested that the Court could hear
cases in panels, but both leave the door open to review by the en banc Court,
thus retaining an ultimate presumption of “one [indivisible] supreme Court” of
last resort. Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III, 65 B.U. L.
REV. 205, 268 n.213 (1985); Byron R. White, Challenges for the U.S. Supreme
Court and the Bar, 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 275 passim (1982); cf. FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 287–89
(1928) (discussing proposals for dividing responsibility for evaluating petitions
for certiorari); Eugene Gressman, The National Court of Appeals: A Dissent,
59 A.B.A. J. 253, 255 (1973) (discussing a 1927 proposal by Felix Frankfurter
for panel screening of petitions for certiorari).
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II. THE TWO SUPREME COURTS
In 1802, however, President Thomas Jefferson and the Republican Congress created a second Supreme Court, of a sort: a
one-justice rump Court to sit at an August Term.41 The Republicans did not empower this Court to perform all of the functions of the full Court, but even the limited authority they did
grant to it—combined with the active compliance of Chief Justices John Marshall and Roger Taney and their colleagues, and
its unchallenged survival for more than thirty years—suggests
that the constitutional indivisibility of the “one supreme Court”
was understood to permit at least some limited legislative manipulation of the internal structure of that one Court.
A. FROM “MIDNIGHT JUDGES” TO “MONGREL COURT”
In what Jefferson called “the Revolution of 1800,” he and
his Republican partisans defeated the Federalists in that year’s
presidential and congressional elections.42 President John Adams and the outgoing Federalist Congress took advantage of
the subsequent lame-duck legislative session to create several
new judgeships and fill them with Federalists.43 The new denizens of this enlarged judiciary were the “Midnight Judges”44
whose commissions Adams was diligently signing, and his Secretary of State John Marshall was somewhat ineptly distributing,45 in the hours before the last Federalist President’s term
ended. Jefferson and the Republicans were unhappy with this
maneuver, and set about undoing it shortly after they took office.46 The result was the Repeal Act of March 8, 1802.47 It was
41. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 31, § 2, 2 Stat. 156, 156, repealed by Act of
Feb. 28, 1839, ch. 36, § 7, 5 Stat. 321, 322.
42. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Judge Spencer Roane (Sept. 6, 1819),
in 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 140 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., New
York, The Knickerbocker Press 1899). For a thorough examination of the
“Revolution,” see generally DANIEL SISSON, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION OF
1800 (1974).
43. Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89 (repealed 1802) (“Midnight
Judges Act”).
44. 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 188 (rev. ed. 1926).
45. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 87, 1 Cranch 137 (1803); WILLIAM E. NELSON, MARBURY V. MADISON: THE ORIGINS AND LEGACY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 57 (2000).
46. 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 15–16 (1801) (President’s Message); id. at 23 (repeal bill introduced by Sen. Breckenridge); WILLIAM S. CARPENTER, JUDICIAL
TENURE IN THE UNITED STATES 55–63 (1918); FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra
note 40, at 26–28.
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followed a few weeks later by the “Act to amend the Judicial
System of the United States” (April Act), which—in the course
of insulating the Repeal Act from effective judicial review by
the Supreme Court—created the one-Justice Court with which
this Article is concerned.48
Debates on the floors of the House and Senate, and private
correspondence among the Justices, highlighted constitutional
objections to key provisions in the Repeal Act and the April Act,
but the section of the Repeal Act creating the one-Justice rump
Court was not one of them. While there were a few objections
on policy grounds, it was constitutionally unobjectionable in
Congress and the Court. Based on the course of legislation—
from the Midnight Judges Act to the Repeal Act to the April
Act—the rump Court was, to all appearances, accepted as either a pragmatic (if one was a Republican) or a cosmetic (if one
was a Federalist) compromise between abolition and preservation of one of the Court’s two annual terms.
The Midnight Judges Act of 1801 “combined thoughtful
concern for the federal judiciary with selfish concern for the
Federalist party.”49 It was designed to serve two functions: (1)
to repair several defects in the Judiciary Acts of 178950 and
1793,51 most importantly by relieving members of the Supreme
Court of the circuit-riding duties they had borne since 1789;52
and (2) to embed as many Federalists as possible in the judicial
branch as a bulwark against the incoming Republican Congress
and President, by creating sixteen new circuit court judgeships
for the lame duck Federalists to fill before they left office.53
The Repeal Act of 1802 was the Republicans’ straightforward response: it declared that the Midnight Judges Act “is

47. Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132.
48. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 31, 2 Stat. 156 (partially repealed 1839).
49. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE JEFFERSONIANS 1801–1829, at 11–12 (2001); FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 40, at
24–25.
50. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
51. Act of Mar. 2, 1793, ch. 22, 1 Stat. 333.
52. Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, § 27, 2 Stat. 89, 98 (repealed 1802).
53. Id. §§ 6–7, 2 Stat. at 90–91. As Jefferson not entirely unfairly characterized the intentions of the Federalists, “[T]hey have retired into the Judiciary as a stronghold. There the remains of federalism are to be preserved and
fed from the treasury, and from that battery all the works of republicanism
are to be beaten down and erased.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John
Dickinson (Dec. 19, 1801), in 10 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 301, 302
(Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1904).
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hereby repealed.”54 Alas, repeal raised troubling constitutional
problems, the most significant being the abolition of the sixteen
new judgeships, all of which were already occupied.55 The Constitution provides that “Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour,”56
and no one of consequence was claiming that any of the new
judges had engaged in impeachably bad behavior. Nor was
there any doubt that the Federalists had complied with the
constitutional requirements of presidential nomination, senatorial advice and consent, presidential appointment and commissioning, and judicial oath-taking.57 So there was no way for the
Republicans to remove or ignore the new judges on constitutional grounds. Nor was there any sentiment for the delayed
gratification of a statute under which the new judgeships would
expire with the incumbents.58 The Republican revolution required a prompt return to the status quo ante the Midnight
Judges Act. And thus the only acceptable solution was to torpedo the new judgeships with the Midnight Judges still on
board, notwithstanding the apparent Article III prohibition on
the removal of well-behaved judges. The Republicans justified
the judicial abolitions on the ground that the Constitution
merely protected a judge’s office-holding so long as the office existed, but that nothing prevented Congress and the President
from abolishing the office itself, and once the office was gone,
the judge no longer had any constitutionally-protected right to

54. Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, § 1, 2 Stat. 132, 132. The full story of the
elaborate politicking and rhetoric surrounding the judiciary acts of 1801–02 is
beyond the scope of this Article. For thorough treatments, see generally RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS 36–68 (1971); GEORGE LEE HASKINS
& HERBERT A. JOHNSON, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: FOUNDATIONS OF POWER 163–68 (1981).
55. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 40, at 21 n.56.
56. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
57. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, art. II, § 3, art. VI, cl. 3; see also Act
of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 8, 1 Stat. 73, 76 (requiring Justices and judges to
take an oath of office).
58. The Midnight Judges Act itself included such a provision reducing the
size of the Supreme Court from six to five on the next departure of an Associate Justice, expected to be the aged and ailing William Cushing. SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REORGANIZATION OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, S.
REP. NO. 75-711, at 12 (1937); see also Act of July 23, 1866, ch. 210, § 1, 14
Stat. 209, 209 (depriving President Andrew Johnson of the power to fill vacancies on the Supreme Court by providing that “no vacancy in the office of associate justice of the supreme court shall be filled by appointment until the number of associate justices shall be reduced to six”).
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hold it.59 The Federalist minority sensibly pointed out that this
would make a nullity of judicial independence under Article
III.60 Both sides invoked the Constitution’s “one supreme
Court” mandate. The Republicans cited it to contrast Congress’s constitutional inability to destroy the Supreme Court
with its constitutional authority to destroy inferior courts,61
while the Federalists used the same language to justify the
Midnight Judges Act,62 suggesting that circuit-riding improperly hampered the capacity of the Justices to sit as a Court.63
Although the Federalists probably had the better constitutional
argument,64 the Republicans had the votes in Congress, and a
President who approved.65
It was not at all clear, however, that the Republicans had
the votes on the Supreme Court to uphold the constitutionality
of the Repeal Act. The Court was populated entirely by Federalists, and by judges who hated to ride circuit. In fact, private
correspondence among the Justices reveals that Chief Justice
John Marshall and Justice Samuel Chase were decidedly for
59. See, e.g., 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 27–30 (1802) (statement of Sen.
Breckenridge); id. at 59–62 (statement of Sen. Mason). This proposition may
seem outrageous today, but it had at least some legal support at the time. See,
e.g., 5 JOHN COMYNS, A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 155 (Samuel Rose
ed., London, A. Strahan 4th ed. 1800); 3 WILLIAM CRUISE, A DIGEST OF THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND RESPECTING REAL PROPERTY 165 (London, A. Strahan
1804).
60. See, e.g., 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 33–34 (1802) (statement of Sen. Mason); id. at 56–57 (statement of Sen. Tracy); id. at 126–32 (statement of Sen.
Chipman).
61. See, e.g., id. at 48 (statement of Sen. Jackson) (“The word shall, applied to the Supreme Court, is imperative and commanding, while the word
may, applied to the inferior courts, is discretionary, and leaves to the Legislature a volition to act, or not to act, as it sees fit.”); id. at 27–28 (statement of
Sen. Breckenridge).
62. See, e.g., id. at 86 (statement of Sen. Morris) (“The Constitution says,
the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in inferior
courts. The Legislature can therefore only organize one Supreme Court, but
they may establish as many inferior courts as they shall think proper.”).
63. See, e.g., id. at 125 (statement of Sen. Chipman); see also id. at 53
(statement of Sen. Tracy) (“A court which is to act together, should not be numerous . . . .”).
64. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT:
THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED YEARS 75 (1985); see also Glidden v. Zdanok, 370
U.S. 530, 544–47 (1962) (plurality opinion) (discussing Congress’s control over
territorial courts as opposed to Article III courts); O’Donoghue v. United
States, 289 U.S. 516, 529–38 (1933) (comparing the independence of Article III
judges with that of legislative judges).
65. See CHARLES GROVE HAINES, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 1789–1835, at 227–35 (1960).

DAVIES_3FMT

692

01/23/2006 04:25:30 PM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[90:678

overturning the Repeal Act, while Justices William Cushing,
William Paterson, and Bushrod Washington were unwilling to
take that step.66
Anticipating trouble at the Supreme Court, the Republican
Congress passed the April Act—a transparent and ultimately
successful attempt to insulate the Repeal Act from review by
the Supreme Court until after the Justices had ridden circuit in
the upcoming summer and fall of 1802. By then, the operation
of the Repeal Act would be well-established, and the Justices’
circuit riding would displace the Midnight Judges, thus implicitly conceding the force of the Repeal Act. The April Act
achieved this end by extending the Republican repeal movement to include a provision of the original Judiciary Act of
1789: “so much of the [1789 Act] as provides for the holding a
session of the supreme court of the United States on the first
Monday of August, annually, is hereby repealed.”67 As a result,
the Supreme Court could not sit to hear a challenge to the Repeal Act until its next sitting, in February 1803.68 Eventually,
after caving in and riding circuit (political reality and the arguments of Cushing, Paterson, and Washington having prevailed over the pique of Marshall and Chase), the Court upheld
the constitutionality of some of the Repeal Act’s provisions and
dodged review of the rest,69 to the disappointment of Federalist
pols.70
66. See generally 6 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 104–21 (Charles F.
Hobson ed., 1990) (reprinting Justices’ correspondence discussing the Repeal
Act).
67. Act of April 29, 1802, ch. 31, §1, 2 Stat. 156, 156.
68. See HAINES, supra note 65, at 243 (“As the Judiciary debate progressed in the spring of 1802, the Congressional leaders decided to abolish the
August session, except for the receipt of motions and other routine matters.
The result of these enactments was that the Supreme Court sat in December,
1801, and did not meet again to hear cases until February, 1803.”).
69. Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. 185, 190–91, 1 Cranch 298, 308–09 (1803); see
also BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS: JEFFERSON, MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 163–98 (2005);
CARPENTER, supra note 46, at 76–78 (discussing the effect and constitutionality of limiting judicial review of the Repeal Act).
70. See, e.g., WILLIAM PLUMER’S MEMORANDUM OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE
UNITED STATES SENATE 1803–1807, at 103 (Everett S. Brown ed., 1923)
(“When the Judges of the Circuit Court were removed by the repeal of the law
in 1802, then was the time for the Judges of the Supreme Court, to have taken
their stand against the encroachments of Congress & of the Executive. That
Court ought to have declared the repealing law unconstitutional—they ought
to have refused to have held Circuit Courts . . . . But unfortunately there was
then a diversity of opinion in the Supreme Court upon this subject[.]”).
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But the Republicans’ hostility toward federal judges in
general and the Supreme Court Justices in particular (at least
so long as they were Federalists) did not manifest itself in an
unrealistic plan to do away with the national judiciary entirely.71 The Republicans abolished the August en banc sitting
of the Court, but they preserved the February sitting.72 And, in
an effort to keep the wheels of justice turning at the Court—
and perhaps take the edge off Federalist claims that the abolition of the August Term created by the Judiciary Act of 1789
was a scurrilous ploy to avoid judicial review of the Repeal
Act—they created in the second section of the April Act a new
kind of Supreme Court session, limited to procedural issues
and conducted by one Justice:
And be it further enacted, That it shall be the duty of the associate
justice resident in the fourth circuit formed by this act, to attend at
the city of Washington on the first Monday of August next, and on the
first Monday of August each and every year thereafter, who shall
have power to make all necessary orders touching any suit, action,
appeal, writ of error, process, pleadings or proceedings, returned to
the said court or depending therein, preparatory to the hearing, trial
or decision of such action, suit, appeal, writ of error, process, pleadings or proceedings: and that all writs and process may be returnable
to the said court on the said first Monday in August, in the same
manner as to the session of the said court, herein before directed to be
holden on the first Monday in February, and may also bear teste on
the said first Monday in August, as though a session of the said court
was holden on that day, and it shall be the duty of the clerk of the supreme court to attend the said justice on the said first Monday of August, in each and every year, who shall make due entry of all such
matters and things as shall or may be ordered as aforesaid by the said
justice, and at each and every such August session, all actions, pleas,
and other proceedings relative to any cause, civil or criminal, shall be
continued over to the ensuing February session.73

Federalists in Congress were as outraged in April by the
April Act as they had been in March by the Repeal Act, but almost none of their anger—and absolutely none of their constitutional objections—was directed at the new rump Court. They
taunted the Republicans about the true purpose of the April
Act: “Are the justices of the Supreme Court objects of terror to
[Republican] gentlemen? . . . Are they afraid that they will pro71. See HAINES, supra note 65, at 224. There were a couple of hotheaded
exceptions, but lacking Jefferson’s support, their calls for abolition of the Federalist judiciary went nowhere. DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON THE PRESIDENT:
FIRST TERM, 1801–1805, at 110–35 (1970).
72. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 31, § 1, 2 Stat. 156, 156.
73. Id. § 2, 2 Stat. at 156.
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nounce the repealing law void?”74 The Republicans replied with
the obvious reciprocal: “But we have as good a right to suppose
[Federalist] gentlemen on the other side are as anxious for a
session in June [or August], that this power may be exercised,
as they have to suppose we wish to avoid it, to prevent the exercise.”75 Supplementing such barbs with plausible constitutional objections to the April Act was harder. James Bayard,
who led the Federalist opposition to the Repeal Act and the
April Act in the House of Representatives,76 was reduced to
spluttering, “The effect of the present bill will be, to have no
court for fourteen months. Is this Constitutional?”77 He had no
answer for his own question, and the Republicans felt no need
to provide one.78 Debate on policy grounds continued for a short
while, with the Federalists complaining mightily that the abolition of the August sitting by the full Court would prolong litigation and encourage abusive delay tactics by defendants.79 Federalists derided the August-Term rump Court, as “a certain
mongrel court . . . to consist of one justice, vested with power to
take preliminary steps without authority to take final ones.”80
But that was as far as it went. The April Act passed without a
single objection that the rump Court suffered from any constitutional defect involving the “one supreme Court” requirement,
or, for that matter, any other provision of the Constitution.81
The rump Court passed muster even more easily at the
Supreme Court itself, where it was never questioned by Justices or litigants. The Justices, who were fulminating and debating in their internal correspondence about the constitutionality of the abolition of the circuit courts and the reinstitution
of circuit-riding for themselves,82 were apparently perfectly un-

74. 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 1229 (1802) (statement of Rep. Bayard).
75. Id. (statement of Rep. Nicholson).
76. Bayard also delivered the Presidency for Thomas Jefferson a year earlier. See ELKINS & MCKITTRICK, supra note 37, at 748–50.
77. 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 1229 (1802) (statement of Rep. Bayard). Bayard
was correct about the fourteen-month gap, which ran from the last sitting of
the full Court under the Midnight Judges Act (December 1801) to the first sitting of the full Court under the April Act (February 1803).
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., id. at 1205, 1210 (statement of Rep. Bayard); id. at 1207
(statement of Rep. Griswold); id. at 1207–08 (statement of Rep. Dennis).
80. Id. at 1205 (statement of Rep. Bayard).
81. See id. at 1205–11.
82. See supra notes 66, 69 and accompanying text.
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concerned about the new rump August Term. Even Justice
Chase, who wrote to Chief Justice Marshall on April 24, 1802,
that he was prepared to lose his seat on the Court in the fight
against the unconstitutional terms of the Repeal Act, placidly
expressed in that same letter his hope for an early conference of
the Court to discuss strategy, suggesting “that the Judges could
meet me, at Washington, on the first Monday of August next,
when I must be there to prepare the Cases for trial.”83 Chase
was the “associate justice resident in the fourth circuit formed
by [the April] act” who was assigned the “duty of . . . attend[ing] at the city of Washington on the first Monday of August next . . . to make all necessary orders touching any suit,
action, appeal, writ of error, process, pleadings or proceedings,
returned to the said court or depending therein.”84 Marshall
forwarded Chase’s invitation to Justice Paterson with similar
complaisance: “he has requested . . . that we should meet in
Washington . . . in August next when he is directed to hold a
sort of a demi session at that place.”85
Less than fifteen years after the ratification of the Constitution, with its “one supreme Court” mandate, nobody said
“boo” about the constitutionality of the rumping of that Court.
There were arguments between the contending political factions about the utility of transforming the Court’s August Term
from a full-blown, en banc, case-or-controversy-deciding session

83. Letter from Samuel Chase to John Marshall (Apr. 24, 1802), in 6 THE
PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 66, at 109, 110.
84. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 31, § 2, 2 Stat. 156, 156, repealed by Act of
Feb. 28, 1839, ch. 36, § 7, 5 Stat. 321, 322. Chase was the Federalist judge
most despised by the Republicans, having been, among other things, the most
vigorous in adjudicating cases brought against Republican publishers under
the Alien and Sedition Acts. See JAMES HAW ET AL., STORMY PATRIOT: THE
LIFE OF SAMUEL CHASE 216–25 (1980). I suspect there may have been some
bear baiting sentiment behind the selection of Chase to serve on the rump
Court—Republicans may have hoped that he would refuse to serve in that capacity, thus providing additional fodder for the soon-to-be-commenced impeachment proceedings against him. See id. After all, it would have been just
as easy and geographically convenient to assign the rump-Court duties to the
slightly less controversial and substantially more widely respected resident of
the Fifth Circuit—Chief Justice John Marshall—instead of the resident of the
Fourth Circuit, as provided by the April Act, as the Fifth Circuit included Virginia at the time. Additionally, this setup might have been less constitutionally questionable, given that the Chief Justice is the only member of the Court
specified by the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
85. Letter from John Marshall to William Paterson (May 3, 1802), in 6
THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 66, at 117, 118.
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into a purely procedural session, but that was as far as it went.
The lack of any constitutional objection to the existence of the
rump Court speaks even more loudly in light of the repeated
invocation of the Constitution in the course of the debates over
other provisions of the Repeal Act and the April Act.86 If there
was ever a time when the constitutionality of legislative interference in Court operations was top of mind, it was in the winter and spring of 1802. And yet the rump Court passed through
unchallenged.
Thus, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, all three
branches of the federal government joined or acquiesced in the
creation of the one-Justice rump Supreme Court of 1802, a
long-lasting illustration of the flexibility of Article III’s “one
[indivisible] supreme Court” requirement.
B. THE “DEMI SESSIONS” OF 1802 TO 1838
The Supreme Court—either in the form of Justice Chase
sitting at the August Term or in the form of the en banc Court
sitting at the February Term—might have resisted the perpetuation of the August Term as a division of the “one [indivisible] supreme Court,” but it did not. Instead the Court chose
to treat both of its forms—en banc and rump—as versions of
the same body, albeit with different ranges of authority depending on whether it was sitting by the authority of the first
section of the April Act (en banc, with broad authority to decide
cases and controversies), or the second (rump, with only limited
procedural powers).87
The opportunity to stymie the August Term rump Court, at
least as an edition of the Supreme Court, arose from the muddy
language of the April Act. Its first section repealed the portion
of the Judiciary Act of 1789 that “provides for the holding of a
session of the supreme court . . . on the first Monday of August,” and its second section merely ordered that one Justice
“attend at the city of Washington on the first Monday of Au-

86. See supra notes 59–65, 77 and accompanying text (noting the constitutional objections to the abolition of the circuit judgeships, the reinstitution of
Supreme Court circuit-riding, and the abolition of the traditional August
Term).
87. Perhaps the Justices did not think about it or did not care, so long as
it served their political ends. This Article assumes that constitutional officers
care about, and consider themselves constrained by, constitutional limits on
their acts and their offices.
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gust . . . to make all necessary orders . . . as though a session of
the said court was holden on that day.”88 But other language in
the April Act made this less than an easy answer, because the
Act was textually of two minds about the status of the August
rump Court. The second section of the Act also referred to the
rump session as “such August session,” and made provisions for
the attendance of the Clerk of the Court and the treatment of
August Term filings and orders that leave little doubt that the
proceedings of the rump Court were to be treated as identical to
proceedings of any other session of the Court.89 In addition, it
used exactly the same language to describe the scope of the
powers of the Justice from the Fourth Circuit sitting at the August Term, and the scope of the powers of less than a quorum of
Justices sitting at the February Term.90 Moreover, if the rump
Court was not a Supreme Court, what could it be? The Constitution grants Congress wide latitude to vest the “judicial
Power . . . in such inferior Courts as [it] may from time to time
ordain and establish.”91 Perhaps the rump Court was some sort
of one-off inferior court, but if it was, it was an inferior court
that performed only functions of the Supreme Court, and the
decisions of which were not subject to any sort of review. In
other words, it was an inferior national court of last resort conducting only unreviewable business of the Supreme Court and
staffed only by a Justice and the Clerk of that Court. This
would have been at most a distinction without a difference, and
maybe not even that.
In any event, neither the Supreme Court nor anyone else
ever treated the August Term as anything other than a session
of the Supreme Court. The behavior of the Justices, the Clerk
of the Court, and counsel appearing at rump sessions all testify
to the recognized legitimacy of the rump Term. None of which
is to say that the August Term was of great substantive consequence,92 at least until near the end of its existence.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Act of Apr. 29, 1802 § 2 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Compare id. § 1, with id. § 2.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
See, e.g., ST. GEORGE TUCKER, 4 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH
NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 30 (1803), reprinted in 4 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 181, 187 (Philip
B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (“[T]here is now but one session of the
supreme court in every year, for hearing and deciding causes therein depending, the session in August being merely preparatory.”).
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At the outset, Samuel Chase, the Justice assigned to serve
as the sole member of the rump Court,93 dutifully came to
Washington on the first Monday of August 1802. He met the
Clerk of the Court, Elias B. Caldwell,94 and, according to the
minutes of the Supreme Court, opened Court as follows:
At a Session of the Supreme Court of the United States, begun
and held at the City of Washington on Monday the 2d day of August
in the year of our Lord 1802 agreeably to the Statute in such Case
made and provided Samuel Chase one of the Associate Justices of the
said Supreme Court and resident of the fourth Circuit was present
and the Clerk of the said Supreme Court attending it is ordered by
the said Judge that the following entries be made in the following actions to wit . . . .95

The first rump Term, like all but one or two of its successors, was short and dull. Chase ordered, and Caldwell recorded,
a few routine joinder orders and the continuation (that is, preservation for hearing at the next Term) of all of the cases on the
Court’s docket.96 The very routineness with which the records
of the first rump August Term are treated support its status as
just another Term of the Supreme Court. The minutes for the
Term are just like the minutes for any other Term of the Court.
The opening paragraph quoted above follows the well-settled
formula used by the Court for all sessions during the preceding
years (other than the references to Chase and his residence),
and the subsequent running head reads “August Term 1802.”97
The whole business appears in the Court’s minute book between the minutes for December Term 1801 and the minutes
for February Term 1803. In other words, the only major differences between August Term 1802 and the Terms that occurred
immediately before and after it were the date, the attendees,
and the scope of the work. Justice Chase and Clerk Caldwell
treated it as a Term, and when the Court met en banc in 1803,
it treated the orders of the August Term as valid exercises of
the Court’s authority, taking up cases in which Chase had issued orders in August without remark.98
93. Act of Apr. 29, 1802 § 2.
94. 1 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1789–1800: PART ONE 163–64 (Maeva Marcus & James R.
Perry eds., 1985) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY: PART ONE].
95. [1790–1805 A] Minutes of the Supreme Court of the United States
127, microformed on Microcopy No. 215, Roll 1 (1790–1828) (Nat'l Archives
Microfilm) [hereinafter Minutes Roll 1].
96. See id. at 127–28.
97. Id. at 128.
98. See id. at 128–36.
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The Court’s minutes record equally uneventful August
Term sittings by Chase from 1803 through 1807.99 The purely
routine nature of the August Term’s docket is reflected in the
1807 minutes, which begin with a formulaic session-opening
paragraph similar to the one quoted above, and then, without
even bothering with the usual list of cases continued, report
that “[i]t is ordered by the said Judge (no counsel attending)
that the causes on the Docket be continued.”100
The full Court and counsel appearing before it also occasionally dealt with issues relating to or arising from the August
Term Court. In 1806 the full Court issued a new rule governing
assignment of errors on appeal, specifying that “[i]n cases not
put to issue at the August Term, it shall be the duty of the
Plaintiff in error, if errors shall not have been assigned in the
Court below, to assign them in this Court at the commencement of the Term.”101 In Blackwell v. Patten, the full Court refused to quash a writ of error that was challenged on the
ground that it had not been properly filed during the preceding
August Term.102 In other cases the Court heard arguments addressing the August Term or issued orders contemplating service or other performance in conjunction with the August
Term.103 Again, no one ever intimated that there was anything

99. See id. at 136–37, 152, 167–68 (recording the 1803–1805 August
Terms); [1806–1817 B] id. at 29, 61 (recording the 1806–1807 August Terms).
100. Id. at 61. Dockets for the early August Terms are hard to come by.
Only one—the rough docket for the 1806 Term—appears to have survived, although there are references to August Terms scattered through February and
January Term dockets covering the period treated here. See generally Rough
Dockets of the United States Supreme Court (on file with National Archives
and Records Administration, Washington, D.C., Record Group 267, Entry 5,
Records of the Supreme Court of the United States, Rough Dockets, 1791 –
Volume 1, 1803, 1806–8, 1810–27, Box 1); Rough Dockets of the United States
Supreme Court (on file with National Archives and Records Administration,
Washington, D.C., Record Group 267, Entry 8, Records of the Supreme Court
of the United States, Rough Dockets, 1803, 1806–8, 1810–1904, 1914–23, Aug.
Term 1806, Feb. Terms 1812, 1818, 1819, 1821, 1822, 1826, Jan. Term 1828,
Box 1).
101. [1806–1817 B] Minutes of the Supreme Court of the United States 28,
microformed on Minutes Roll 1, supra note 95 (recording the 1806 February
Term).
102. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 277, 277–78 (1812).
103. See, e.g., Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 225 (1839); Rhode Island
v. Massachusetts, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 23, 23–24 (1839); New Jersey v. New York,
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 284, 291 (1831) (Baldwin, J., concurring in part); see also
Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 676 (1838) (argument of
counsel).
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improper or constitutionally questionable about the existence
or operation of the rump Court.
Following the August 1807 Term, there is an unexplained
gap in entries of minutes for the August Terms, after which the
routine picks up with Gabriel Duvall (Chase’s successor as Justice resident in the fourth circuit) presiding in 1812.104 Duvall,
perhaps impatient with the mundane routine of the August
Term, appears to have neglected his duties.105 For the 1820
rump sitting, the opening paragraph of the minutes has a blank
space before the words “one of the associate Justices of the said
Supreme Court and resident of the fourth Circuit in the state of
Maryland was present.”106 The same gap appears in the minutes for the 1821 through 1835 August Terms.107 After Duvall’s
retirement in 1835, newly-commissioned Chief Justice Roger
Taney (another resident of the Fourth Circuit) assumed responsibility for the August Term.108 By the time Taney took
over, the August Term proceedings had become nothing more
than clerical rubber-stamp sessions for continuing cases from
one en banc term to the next.109 At the same time, however, the
104. Throughout the existence of the rump August Term, the Fourth Circuit consisted of Maryland and Delaware. Chase was the circuit Justice from
1802 to 1811, Gabriel Duvall from 1811 to 1835, and Roger Taney from 1836
until long after the abolition of the August Term. LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE
SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, AND DEVELOPMENTS 335–
36 tbl.4-12 (3d ed. 2003).
105. See CARL B. SWISHER, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES: THE TANEY PERIOD 1836–1864, at 276 (1974).
106. [1817–1824 C] Minutes of the Supreme Court of the United States
132, microformed on Minutes Roll 1, supra note 95.
107. Id. at 223, 319, 421 (recording the 1821–1823 August Terms); [1824–
1828 D] id. at 531, 627, 735, 889, 1041 (recording the 1824–1828 August
Terms); [1829–1831 E] Minutes of the Supreme Court of the United States
1192, 1396, 1578, microformed on Microcopy No. 215, Roll 2 (1829–1837) (Nat'l
Archives Microfilm) [hereinafter Minutes Roll 2] (recording the 1829–1831
August Terms); [1832–1834 F] id. at 1788, 1956 (recording the 1832–1833 August Terms); [1834–1837 G] id. 3103, 3255 (recording the 1834–1835 August
Terms). On the other hand, William T. Carroll, the Clerk of the Court from
1827 to 1863, appears to have taken the August Term quite seriously during
this period. For example, see the Rough Dockets for the 1828–1830 August
Terms on file with National Archives and Records Administration, Washington D.C., Records Group 267, Entry 8, Box 1, supra note 100.
108. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 104, at 336 tbl.4-12.
109. For example, see the report of Niles’ National Register for August 4,
1838:
It is probably not known to most of our readers—for until yesterday it
was not known to us—that there is a rule term of the supreme court
held, according to law, at the court room in the capitol annually on
the first Monday in August. At this court it is made the business of
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August Terms—and the rules governing them—were widely
recognized by scholars and practitioners as genuine elements of
the Court’s operations.110
Taney was to serve as rump Justice for only three August
Terms, from 1836 to 1838.111 But it was during his relatively
brief tenure that the August Term proceedings—two in particular—most clearly demonstrated that the rump Court was a division of the Supreme Court. First, there was Taney’s presentation of his own letters patent and evidence of oath-taking at the
August 1836 Term. Second, there was his treatment of the case
of Ex parte Hennen at the August 1838 Term, combined with
his second opinion in that case, delivered at the sitting of the
full Court in January 1839.
When Taney ordered that the minutes of the August 1836
Term include his presentation to the Court of his letters patent
(his commission) and evidence that he had taken the constitutional and statutory oaths of office,112 he was following a tradition that had begun on February 2, 1790, with the first member
of the Court, Chief Justice John Jay.113 Before taking a seat on
the Court, every Justice was expected to present his paper
the circuit judge for the fourth judicial district to attend. For many
years past, the business of this court has been entirely pro forma, requiring neither argument by counsel, nor decision by the court; and
the attendance of the judge has not always been deemed necessary.
The Suprmme [sic] Court, 54 NILES’ NAT’L REG. 354 (1838); see also CARL
BRENT SWISHER, ROGER B. TANEY 354 (1935) (reporting that Taney, who lived
in Baltimore, traveled on the Fourth Circuit twice each year, and “[i]n addition
he had to go to Washington each January for the regular term of the Supreme
Court, and in August for a vestigial term at which he alone was required to be
present”).
110. See, e.g., ALFRED CONKLING, A TREATISE ON THE ORGANIZATION, JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 342–43 (Albany, Wm. & A. Gould & Co. 1831); THOMAS F. GORDON, A DIGEST OF THE
LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 150, 152 (Philadelphia, Thomas F. Gordon
1827); THOMAS SERGEANT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: BEING A VIEW OF THE
PRACTICE AND JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF
CONSTITUTIONAL POINTS DECIDED 78, 83–84 (Philadelphia, P.H. Nicklin & T.
Johnson 1830).
111. [1834–1837 G] Minutes of the Supreme Court of the United States
3421, 3539, microformed on Minutes Roll 2, supra note 107 (recording the
1836–1837 August Terms); [1838–1839 H] Minutes of the Supreme Court of
the United States 3829, microformed on Microcopy No. 215, Roll 3 (1838–1848)
(Nat'l Archives Microfilm) [hereinafter Minutes Roll 3] (recording the 1838
August Term).
112. [1834–1837 G] Minutes of the Supreme Court of the United States
3421–35, microformed on Minutes Roll 2, supra note 107.
113. See 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY: PART ONE, supra note 94, at 1–7.
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qualifications to the Court. Every member of the Court had
done so (or, in a few cases, was presumed to have done so),114
for more than forty years. It is difficult to believe that Taney, or
the Clerk, could have viewed his presentation of his papers at
the August Term as anything other than the traditional presentation of papers to the Court before taking a seat on it, an assumption that is only reinforced by Taney’s failure to present
his papers at the next sitting of the full Court in January
1837.115
Second, and even more telling, was Taney’s treatment of
Duncan Hennen’s request for a mandamus to the federal district judge for the Eastern District of Louisiana, or an order to
show cause.116 Hennen was seeking an order “requiring the
said Judge to restore Duncan N. Hennen to the office of Clerk
of said District Court.”117 Taney doubted that the April Act empowered the August rump Court to issue either the mandamus
or an order to show cause.118 Nevertheless, Taney took the extraordinary steps of hearing argument in the case at the August Term,119 and then issuing the requested order to show
cause.120 As he explained in an opinion for the full Court in the
114. See Davies, supra note 38 (manuscript at 17–22).
115. Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 225, 228 (1839); [1834–1837 G]
Minutes of the Supreme Court of the United States 3435–39, microformed on
Minutes Roll 2, supra note 107.
116. Ex parte Hennen (Aug. 6, 1838) (Taney, C.J., unpublished August
Term opinion), reprinted infra App.; [1838–1839 H] Minutes of the Supreme
Court of the United States 3829–50, microformed on Minutes Roll 3, supra
note 111 (recording the 1838 August Term).
117. Ex parte Hennen, infra App.
118. Id.
119. As reported by Niles’ National Register:
We understand . . . that chief justice Taney, now judge of the fourth
circuit will be on the bench on Monday [August 6] next, the term day;
and that the highly interesting case of the removal from office, avowedly without cause, of the clerk of the circuit court for the District of
Louisiana, will come before him, upon a motion to show cause why a
writ of mandamus should not issue to that court to restore the old
clerk to the discharge of the duties of his office.
The Suprmme [sic] Court, supra note 109, at 354; see also Supreme Court of
the U. States, 54 NILES’ NAT’L REG. 373 (1838) (reporting at length on the August 6 proceedings before Taney, which included extensive reading from the
pleadings by Richard S. Coxe, counsel for Hennen).
120. Ex parte Hennen, infra App.; Supreme Court of the U. States, supra
note 119, at 373 (reporting that “the court granted rules in both cases, returnable to the ensuing term of the supreme court, to be held in January next” and
“transact[ed] some other [unspecified] business” before “the court adjourned to
the next term”).
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same case at the next January Term, Taney had engaged in
this maneuver because “the question was an important one,
and might again occur; [and] I thought it proper that it should
be settled by the judgment of the Court at its regular session,
and not by a single judge.”121 He then went on to explain that,
“I therefore laid the rule [to show cause], because it was the
only mode in which I could bring the subject before the Court
for decision.”122 There is only one reason why Taney would have
seen issuing the order to show cause as the only way to bring
the issue to the full Supreme Court: if he understood that the
rump Court was also the Supreme Court. If the rump Court
was an inferior court, Taney could have denied Hennen’s petition at the August Term and the en banc Court could have
heard Hennen’s appeal from the denial at its following January
Term.123 But if the rump Court was a Supreme Court, then
there could be no appeal from the denial, the Supreme Court
being the court of last resort. Therefore, the only way to keep
the case alive from the August Term to the January Term for
consideration by the full Court was to deny the petition for a
mandamus, issue the order to show cause, and make it returnable during the January Term, at which time the full Court
would have the opportunity to consider it. Taney explained:
1. Whether the Supreme Court have the power to issue a writ of
mandamus in such a case as that described in the petition. —
2. If the Supreme Court have the power is it also given to the Judge of
121. Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 225, 229 (1839). Taney’s use of the
word “judge” rather than “Justice” when describing the rump Court is of no
moment. During his tenure the two terms were routinely bandied about as
equivalents in arguments before the Court and in published opinions. Thus,
for example, in his opinion for the Court in United States v. Ferreira, Taney
refers both to the “Justices of the Supreme Court” and to the “judges of the
Supreme Court.” 54 U.S. 43, 54–55, 13 How. 40, 50–51 (1852); see also, e.g.,
Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 565–67 (1842) (argument of counsel); id. at 631 (Taney, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Kendall
v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 653 (1838) (Taney, C.J., dissenting).
More telling is the contrast in Ex parte Hennen between the Court at “regular
session”—that is, the collective body—and the Court sitting as a “single”
judge—that is, the individual, rump body. Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.)
at 229. Taney clearly disapproved of this statutory construct, but just as
clearly believed he was bound to operate within it, at least for the time being.
122. Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) at 229.
123. See, e.g., Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 513 (1840) (Taney,
C.J.) (“This case is brought here by a writ of error, from the judgment of the
Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Columbia, refusing to
award a peremptory mandamus.”). The Court has continued to hear such appeals in modern times. See, e.g., Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296,
308–09 (1989).
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the 4th Circuit, by the act of Congress of 1802. ch. 291. s.2. establishing the August term. —
....
. . . If the Supreme Court shall be of opinion that I have not the power
at this term to lay this rule, it will of course be discharged by the
court at the January Term.124

That is precisely what Taney did—issue an order when he
was “strongly inclined to the opinion that [he] had no power to
[issue], in any case, at the August Term”125—because there was
no appeal from the August Term, as it was the Supreme Court.
Taney would only have approached Ex parte Hennen in this
manner if he had been “strongly inclined to the opinion” that
the August Term was a Term of the Supreme Court.126

124. Ex parte Hennen, infra App.
125. Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) at 229.
126. A small but significant difference—the word “or” versus the word
“as”—between the reported and original manuscript versions of Taney’s January 1839 opinion for the full Court in Ex parte Hennen suggests an additional
and even more extraordinary possibility. His reported opinion begins as follows: “At the August term of the Supreme Court, held by the Chief Justice or
Judge for the fourth circuit, according to the act of Congress of 1802 . . . .” 38
U.S. (13 Pet.) at 228 (emphasis added). His manuscript opinion begins: “At the
August Term of the Supreme Court, held by the Chief Justice as Judge for the
4th circuit, according to the act of Congress of 1802 . . . .” Ex parte Hennen,
(Jan. 26, 1839) (Taney, C.J., unpublished draft opinion) (on file with National
Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C., Record Group 267,
Entry 27, Opinions in Original Jurisdiction Cases, 1835, 1837–1839, Box 1)
(emphasis added). The “or” in the reported opinion could be read in any number of ways, all consistent with Taney’s service as a Justice on the rump Court.
But the “as” in the manuscript opinion lends itself to another interpretation as
well—that Taney thought he was sitting as a circuit judge, an inferior Article
III judge, on the Supreme Court, doing the Court’s business. Given the sloppiness of which Reporter of Decisions Richard Peters Jr. was accused by some
Justices and other interested observers, this supposition may not be implausible. See SWISHER, supra note 105, at 298–306; G. EDWARD WHITE, HISTORY OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE MARSHALL COURT & CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815–35, at 407–12 (abr. ed. 1991); Craig Joyce, The Rise of
the Supreme Court Reporter: An Institutional Perspective on Marshall Court
Ascendance, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1291, 1361–62 (1985). However, if this interpretation was accurate, it would support a range of options for Congress dramatically wider than proposed in this Article. Such options might include the designation of judges of inferior federal courts to serve on the Supreme Court, see
Moss & Siskel, supra note 3, at 1042–47; Continuity of Gov’t Comm’n, supra
note 2 (statement of James C. Duff), or the creation of a non–Article III court
capable of handling the business of the Supreme Court. I have, however, found
no other evidence to support such possibilities, and it is also quite possible
that either Taney or Peters, with whom Taney was on friendly terms,
SWISHER, supra note 105, at 300–04, caught the implications of the manuscript’s use of “as” and intentionally changed it for the reported version.
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The dust-up over Ex parte Hennen did generate at least a
little bit of media coverage for the August Term, apparently the
only public attention it ever enjoyed.127 It is possible that
Taney, a sophisticated politician as well as a sophisticated lawyer, deliberately made a mountain out of Hennen’s molehill in
order to raise congressional awareness of the useless relic (and
waste of Taney’s time for a few days every year) that the August Term had become.128 If so, it worked. The August Term
provision of the April Act was repealed without fanfare in February 1839, on unelaborated grounds of “efficiency” as part of
an omnibus act dealing with a variety of judicial business.129
Thus, the division of the Supreme Court into en banc and
rump versions that was begun at the beginning of the nineteenth century persisted for most of the first half of that century, without objection on constitutional grounds.
III. THE CONTINUOUS COURT
It would seem that the conventional assumption that Congress cannot engage in any reorganization of the Supreme
Court without authorization in the form of a constitutional
amendment is, at least to a limited and hard-to-define extent,
wrong. The extent to which this insight is relevant to modern
questions about legislative authority to develop a more durable
Supreme Court for the age of terror is another matter. Congress could pass on the opportunity (and avoid the responsibil127. See The Suprmme [sic] Court, supra note 109, at 354; Supreme Court
of the U. States, supra note 119, at 373. An 1829 Senate report on “the propriety and necessity of so amending the Judicial System of the United States, as
to place all the States in a similar situation, and furnish to the citizens of each
an equal opportunity of having due administration of justice” made no mention of the rump Court. S. REP. NO. 20-50, at 1–7 (1829).
128. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
129. Act of Feb. 28, 1839, ch. 36, § 7, 5 Stat. 321, 322 (repealing the Act of
Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 31, § 2, 2 Stat. 156, 156, and thereby abolishing the August
Term); JOHN FORSYTH, REPORT FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE, IN COMPLIANCE WITH A RESOLUTION OF THE SENATE, SHOWING THE NUMBER OF SUITS
ON THE TRIAL DOCKET OF EACH OF THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE UNITED
STATES, AND THE NUMBER OF MILES TRAVEL OF EACH JUDGE OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, S. DOC. NO. 25-50, at 32–33 (1839) (recording
that Chief Justice Taney included mileage to Washington for the August
Term); J. SEN. 25th Cong., 2d Sess. (Mar. 13, 1838), at 288 (noting the resolution submitted by Senator Clay seeking a report from the Secretary of State
regarding the distances traveled by judges); see also ALFRED CONKLING, A
TREATISE ON THE ORGANIZATION, JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE OF THE COURTS
OF THE UNITED STATES 693 n.a (Albany, W.C. Little and Co. 3d ed. 1856) (noting that “[t]he August term has been abolished”).
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ity) to consider a more active role in assuring Supreme Court
continuity, or it could explore potentially useful modern analogs to the antique rump Court.
Avoidance could take any one of several forms. There are
plenty of rationales for ignoring or belittling this history now.
First, it is possible that the whole business was unconstitutional, or at least it would be today. The Constitution evolves in
the hands of our judges,130 and if nothing else, it could be a denial of due process.131 Second, and relatedly, the rump Court
came and went before constitutional substance and procedure
began to merge in the Supreme Court.132 It may not be possible
to have a purely procedural Supreme Court any more, or perhaps anything other than a full-fledged Court on the Morrison
Waite model.133 Third, the passage of more than 150 years
130. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1190–91 (2005) (discussing “evolving standards of decency”); id. at 1222 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
131. See U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV.
132. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Dred Scott Case, with Notes on Affirmative
Action, the Right to Die & Same-Sex Marriage, 1 GREEN BAG 2D 39, 40–41
(1997).
133. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. On the other hand, there are
contexts in which members of the Court have continued to sit as something
more than a single Justice on circuit and less than the full Court (or a quorum
thereof). For example, when dealing with especially volatile political cases,
Justices have occasionally compromised the independence of their supposedly
atomistic decision making as circuit Justices. The most prominent example is
the Holtzman v. Schlesinger litigation over the constitutionality of the bombing of Cambodia by the United States in the summer of 1973. After Justices
William O. Douglas and Thurgood Marshall issued conflicting in-chambers decisions, Marshall enlisted the support of all seven other members of the Court
in support of his position. Holtzman v. Schlessinger, 414 U.S. 1321, 1322
(1973) (Marshall, J., in chambers). That decided the matter and elicited from
Douglas the only published dissent ever from an in-chambers opinion. See id.
at 1322–26 (Douglas, J., dissenting). And when Justice Mahlon Pitney was
confronted by a particularly difficult election dispute in the summer of 1912,
he invited Justice Willis Van Devanter to join him, and the two heard oral argument and issued a joint in-chambers opinion denying relief. Marks v. Davis,
4 Rapp 1413, 1413–14 (1912) (Van Devanter & Pitney, JJ., in chambers); Ross
E. Davies, Faithless Electors of 1912, 4 GREEN BAG 2D 179, 180–81, 186–87
figs.1, 2 & 3 (2001). Nevertheless, these quasi-Courts are at least technically
not competitors with the “one supreme Court” because in-chambers opinions
are generally subject to review by the full Court. See Stephen M. Shapiro &
Miriam R. Nemetz, An Introduction to In-Chambers Opinions, 2 Rapp ix, xvii–
xviii (2004). However, the practical (as opposed to precedential) difference between a decision by the full Court and an in-chambers opinion issued under
the authority of a single circuit Justice with the support of the other Justices
may be quite limited. See, e.g., Holtzman, 414 U.S. at 1322 (Marshall, J., in
chambers) (“I have been in communication with the other Members of the
Court and [all seven of them] agree with this action.”).
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without a statutory sequel to the April Act’s creation of the
rump Court may be grounds for constitutional desuetude of the
Guarantee Clause variety.134 However, this view could also
support an argument that a statute passed by a Congress bold
enough to act at this late date would raise only political questions secure from judicial review.135 Fourth, Congress could
simply punt this one to the Supreme Court, which, in the absence of a self-discovered power of self-perpetuation, would
amount to nothing. Where there is a will there is probably a
way.
But assuming instead that Congress will not punt and the
Supreme Court would not invalidate the rump Court,136 exploration could take at least as many forms as avoidance. There
are reasons for some optimism on this front, because a rump
Court law would not stand alone: over the centuries Congress
has created and the Supreme Court has accepted other compromises of “one supreme Court” literalism.137 For example, the
quorum requirement in Title 28 is really nothing more than a
statutory license to the Justices to carry on their business with
a rump, so long as it is of a certain size.138 Much the same can
be said of the statutory provision for a substitute drawn from
the Court’s membership when the Chief Justice is unable to
serve.139 And there is 28 U.S.C. § 2109,140 which permits a
Chief Justice confronted by a Court without a quorum to remand a case to a body that looks a bit like a semi-inferior rump
court—a specially-formed, “final and conclusive” panel of appel134. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4; see also, e.g., United States v. Plunk, 153 F.3d
1011, 1021 (9th Cir. 1998); Amar, supra note 40, at 237 n.110.
135. Cf. Arthur E. Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4:
A Study in Constitutional Desuetude, 46 MINN. L. REV. 513, 560–69 (1962) (arguing for limited judicial review of legislation enacted under on the Guarantee
Clause power).
136. A rejection of the rump Court by a modern Court might satisfy certain
Article III don’t-tread-on-me sensibilities, but it could also devastate some of
the Court’s nineteenth century precedents. See Davies, supra note 38 (manuscript at 62–63).
137. It is possible that all departures from the operation of “one supreme
Court” consisting of all of its members discussed below are unconstitutional,
but if that is the case then there may well turn out to be sufficient support to
generate and ratify a constitutional amendment dealing with quorums and
recusals, and that would provide an opportunity to deal with continuity of the
Court at the same time without statutory creativity of the sort proposed in
this Article.
138. See 28 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
139. See id. § 3.
140. See id. § 2109.
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late court judges.141 Thus, the pedigree provided by the original
rump Court statute is not the only source of validation for a
modern version. Such a law would be surrounded by other
statutes reflecting contemporary notions of the flexibility of the
Constitution’s “one supreme Court” language,142 and it would
serve the policies outlined in the introduction to this Article.
And so the possibilities on the table for perpetuation of a
decimated Supreme Court should be revisited and perhaps expanded with an eye to some key attributes of the April Act’s
rump Court, all of which point to the constitutionally charming
nature of the relationship between the rump Court and the full
Court. Most importantly, the two versions of the Supreme
Court did not interfere with each other or meddle with the capacity or credibility of the Court as a whole to decide cases and
controversies as the national court of last resort. Consider the
following manifestations of that relationship:
(1) Preserving involvement of active Justices in deciding
cases. The August rump Court conducted important, if boring
and largely ministerial, Supreme Court functions, but the Justice sitting at that term had no power to decide a single case or
controversy.143 And with the exception of Roger Taney’s preservation of Ex parte Hennen for review by the full Court,144 the
rump Court never posed as deciding any case or controversy. In
other words, no Justice was ever stripped from the decision of a
case. Existing statutory qualifications of the “one supreme
Court” requirement also reflect the importance of this principle.
Thus, the quorum requirement at 28 U.S.C. § 1 is, again, best
read as a limited license—not a mandate—to the Court to operate as a rump. Similarly, the provisions of Title 28 governing
judicial discipline (including the constitutionally questionable
grant of power to panels of judges to limit or eliminate the abil-

141. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 322 U.S. 716 (1944),
transferred to 148 F.2d 416, 421 (2d Cir. 1945); see also United States v. Will,
449 U.S. 200, 212 (1980) (describing 28 U.S.C. § 2109).
142. See Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 621–23 (1990);
Laura Kalman, Border Patrol: Reflections on the Turn to History in Legal
Scholarship, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 87, 95–124 (1997); Suzanna Sherry, The
Ghost of Liberalism Past, 105 HARV. L. REV. 918, 923–28 (1992) (reviewing
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (1991)).
143. See Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 31, § 2, 2 Stat. 156, 156, repealed by Act of
Feb. 28, 1839, ch. 36, § 7, 5 Stat. 321, 322.
144. See Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 225, 228–29 (1839); Ex parte
Hennen (Aug. 6, 1838) (Taney, C.J., unpublished August Term opinion), reprinted infra App.
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ity of fellow judges to hear and decide cases) do not apply to
members of the Supreme Court.145 And while the recusal requirements detailed in 28 U.S.C. § 455 speak in compulsory
terms,146 each individual Justice has traditionally exercised
perfectly unbridled and unreviewed discretion when it comes to
the decision whether to recuse herself or himself in any case.147
(2) Preserving the functionally indivisible Court. The rump
Court never sat in competition with the conventional en banc
Court. In other words, while there was more than one division
of the Court, there was never more than one supreme tribunal
in operation at any time. Similarly, the historical power of reviewability of in-chambers decisions reflects the subordination
of Justices sitting as individuals and small groups to the collective sitting as the “one supreme Court.”148
(3) No Justice was compelled to participate in anything
other than the conventional en banc Court. Although the Congress that passed the April Act may (or may not) have targeted
Justice Chase for rump Court duty, the statute itself was
phrased in neutral terms. It specified that “the associate justice
resident in the fourth circuit formed by this act” would sit at
the August Term,149 which meant that Chase could have moved
out of Maryland, thereby relinquishing the rump Court, and
any other member of the Court could have moved into Maryland or Delaware (the two states that made up the Fourth Circuit at the time), thereby taking up the rump mantle.150
The bottom line: Congress fiddled with the Court’s structure to serve its own ends, but it did not interfere with the capacity of any Justice seated on the Court to participate in the
145. 28 U.S.C. § 372; see also David J. Garrow, Mental Decrepitude on the
U.S. Supreme Court: The Historical Case for a 28th Amendment, 67 U. CHI. L.
REV. 995, 1065–66 (2000) (discussing the political complexities behind judicial
discipline and the problem of applying statutory discipline measures, other
than impeachment, to the Supreme Court).
146. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 913–17 (2004) (Scalia,
J., in chambers).
147. See Letter from Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist to Senator Patrick
Leahy (Jan. 26, 2004), in 7 GREEN BAG 2D 280, 280 (2004); see also Laird v.
Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 836–39 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers); Jewel Ridge
Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United Mine Workers of Am., 325 U.S. 897, 898
(1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in denial of rehearing).
148. See supra note 133 (discussing the status and function of Justices sitting in chambers).
149. See Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 31, § 2, 2 Stat. 156, 156, repealed by Act of
Feb. 28, 1839, ch. 36, § 7, 5 Stat. 321, 322.
150. An admittedly laughable image.

DAVIES_3FMT

710

01/23/2006 04:25:30 PM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[90:678

decision of any case or controversy. Separation of powers and
the independence of the “one supreme Court” were preserved.
Perhaps this was enough—consciously or otherwise—to ensure
a certain level of comfort in all three branches of the federal
government with a divided “one supreme Court” for more than
thirty-five years.
Exploring the possibilities for congressional action in light
of the rump Court experience could suggest new approaches.
Bearing in mind that any proposal for Supreme Court continuity in the event of decimation or destruction of the normal body
will appear odd, even Rube Goldbergesque, consider the following examples, and the likelihood that they are constitutional.
A. RECUSED JUSTICES IN RESERVE
Consider a Conditional Permanent Recusal and Recall of
Justices Act (CPR Act). Under the CPR Act, members of the
Supreme Court would be entitled to permanently recuse themselves from all Court business (with the condition described below), thereby: (a) taking on all the attributes and benefits of a
retired Justice, while keeping all of the perks of being an active
Justice, except for the opportunity to participate in the regular
decision making processes of the Court; and (b) opening a seat
for the President and Congress to fill with a new active Justice;
while (c) remaining a member of the Court and therefore constitutionally available to serve on the Court. The one condition
under which this permanent recusal could be temporarily suspended would be a failure of the Court to reach a quorum. In
that event, a recused Justice would enjoy the power to temporarily void his or her permanent recusal and return to active
duty on the Court, but only: (a) for so long as the Court is unable to reach a quorum via either the recovery of incapacitated
Justices or the filling of vacant seats through the standard
nomination, advise-and-consent, and appointment process; and
(b) if he or she can satisfy the judicial council for the circuit in
which he or she resides of her physical and mental ability to do
the job.151
The CPR Act would not guarantee continuity of the Supreme Court in the event of disaster, but it would probably reduce the odds of total disruption, and at relatively little cost.
The certainty of the Act’s effectiveness would depend entirely
on the willingness of sitting members of the Court to perma151. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 332, 372, 377(d) (2000).
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nently recuse themselves while still competent to serve, and
would increase with the number of willing Justices. The Act
would require very little in the way of revision of the United
States Code. The proposed amendments to Title 28 of the Code
are underlined:
§ 1. Number of justices; quorum – The Supreme Court of the
United States shall consist of a Chief Justice of the United States and
eight associate justices, any six of whom shall constitute a quorum,
plus so many conditionally permanently recused justices as are competent to serve on the Court and who may serve only for the duration
of a failure of the Chief Justice and the associate justices to achieve a
quorum.
§ 4. Precedence of associate justices and of conditionally permanently recused justices – Associate justices shall have precedence according to the seniority of their commissions. Justices whose
commissions bear the same date shall have precedence according to
seniority in age. Conditionally permanently recused justices (as defined in section 455(g) of this title) shall have precedence according to
the seniority of their commissions. Conditionally permanently recused
justices whose commissions bear the same date shall have precedence
according to seniority in age.
§ 5. Salaries of justices – The Chief Justice and each associate justice and conditionally permanently recused justice shall each receive
a salary at annual rates determined under section 225 of the Federal
Salary Act of 1967 (2 U.S.C. 351–361), as adjusted by section 461 of
this title.
§ 42. Allotment of Supreme Court justices to circuits – The
Chief Justice of the United States and the associate justices of the
Supreme Court shall from time to time be allotted as circuit justices
among the circuits by order of the Supreme Court. The Chief Justice
may make such allotments in vacation. When on active service, a conditionally permanently recused justice shall be allotted as circuit justice to the circuit or circuits to which the previous occupant of his or
her seat was allotted. A justice may be assigned to more than one circuit, and two or more justices may be assigned to the same circuit.
§ 455. Disqualification of justice, judge, or magistrate . . . (g)
Any Chief Justice or associate justice of the Supreme Court may at
any time elect to conditionally permanently recuse himself or herself
from all current and future business of the Supreme Court, except
that any such “conditionally permanently recused justice” may temporarily void his or her conditional permanent recusal and return to
active duty on the Court, but only: (1) for so long as the Court is unable to muster a quorum through either the recovery of incapacitated
active members of the Court or the filling of vacant seats by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate; and (2) after a
certificate signed by a majority of the members of the Judicial Council
for the circuit in which he or she resides attesting that he or she suffers from no mental or physical disability rendering him or her unable
to discharge efficiently all the duties of the office is presented to the
President and the President finds that he or she is able to serve.
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The CPR Act would conform to the three characteristics of
the rump Court listed above:
(1) Preserving involvement of active Justices in deciding
cases. Retirement and recusal would remain in the control of
each individual Justice. They would be free to stay or go on the
established terms, and they would have the new recall-andreturn option.
(2) Preserving the functionally indivisible Court. Only one
Court, the current one, would sit. The rump would truly be a
retiring body—doing nothing except in times of crisis, and then
as part of the regular Court. And the CPR Act would achieve
this end without the problems of vote dilution and appearances
of political manipulation that accompanied President Franklin
Roosevelt’s proposal to enlarge the Court.152
(3) No Justice was compelled to participate in anything
other than the conventional en banc Court. Again, retirement,
recusal, and recall are all within the control of the Justice, subject only to their certifiable ability to serve.
There is at least one reason to be pessimistic about this
idea. Justices have been known to develop an apres moi, le deluge view of the Court. They find it difficult to imagine justice
prevailing in their absence, thereby making it their duty to remain on the Court as long as physically possible. Justices
Harry Blackmun and William O. Douglas come to mind.153 How
pervasive this supreme solipsism may be is impossible to determine, no other Justice having been anywhere near as forthright on the subject (at least in public) as Blackmun was in
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.154
There may be some unknown proportion of Justices who, when
considering whether to retire sooner or later, will give no
weight to the prospect of preserving the Court in the event of
152. See generally SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, S. REP. NO. 75-711 (1937).

REORGANIZATION OF

153. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 922–
23, 943 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment
in part, and dissenting in part); see also, e.g., BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, WILD
BILL: THE LEGEND AND LIFE OF WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS 481–95 (2003); JAMES F.
SIMON, INDEPENDENT JOURNEY: THE LIFE OF WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS 447–54
(1980); Garry Wills, Editorial, And Another Douglas, William O., Ought Now
to Resign, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Apr. 9, 1975, at 6.
154. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 922–23, 94 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part,
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part); Garrow, supra
note 145. In fairness to Justice Blackmun, it should be noted that he retired
before he lost his edge, despite the concerns he expressed in Casey. See LINDA
GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN 237–51 (2005).
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terrorist attack or other calamity. On the other hand, there are
plenty of Justices who have retired while still quite sharp. The
impending retirement of an evidently capable and energetic
Sandra Day O’Connor at the relatively early age of 75 is only
the most recent example. Others include Justices Byron White,
Tom Clark, and Arthur Goldberg, as well as Charles Evans
Hughes, both as Justice and as Chief Justice.155 And it may be
that the opportunity to frustrate a terrorist attack on the Supreme Court would foster a greater willingness among sitting
Justices to consider retiring sooner rather than later.
Securing a more reliably available and sufficiently deep
bench of conditionally permanently recused Justices along the
lines of the CPR Act is probably beyond Congress’s power without a constitutional amendment, but there are additional steps
Congress could take. It could seek an agreement with the
President to nominate, confirm, and appoint individuals who
promise to conditionally permanently recuse themselves as
soon as they take office as Justices.156 Under such an agreement and the CPR Act, the President and Senate could take
advantage of the next opening on the Court to install at least
six conditionally permanently recused Justices (enough to
make a quorum if needed) before filling the open seat with a
Justice who would remain active. Such a precommitment strategy might land some of the participants in jail for bribery,157 although a Congress interested in entering deals of this sort
could simply amend § 210 of the federal criminal code to permit
them. Even so, I, like Professor Saul Levmore, “have little
doubt but that other federal courts would find such promises
unenforceable,” on grounds of judicial independence or political
nonjusticiability.158 Therefore, any freshly appointed Justice
who decided to renege on his or her part of such a deal would
probably be beyond the reach of a frustrated President and
Senate, unless the House of Representatives was willing to impeach a Justice under § 210 of the criminal code in order to enforce a criminal deal with the President and Senate.

155. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 104, at 394–400 tbl.5-17.
156. These Justices would not have to sit on their hands for decades. They
could work in the federal appellate courts. 28 U.S.C. §§ 42, 43. Congress could
also amend 28 U.S.C. § 294 to apply to recused as well as retired Justices.
157. See 18 U.S.C. § 210 (criminalizing “[o]ffer[s] . . . to procure appointive
public office”).
158. Saul Levmore, Precommitment Politics, 82 VA. L. REV. 567, 584 (1996).
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B. QUALIFIEDLY QUALIFIED BACK-UP JUSTICES
Or consider a Qualifications for Justices Act (Qualifications
Act). Under the Qualifications Act, the President would have
the authority to nominate and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoint back-up Justices to the Supreme
Court. Those back-ups would be subject to an extra qualification: that some or all of them would take office only in the event
that a catastrophic event killed enough Justices to deprive the
Court of a quorum. Once that qualification was satisfied for a
back-up Justice, he or she would enjoy the same right to hold
the office during good behavior.159
The President has the authority to nominate and the Senate to confirm Justices to the Supreme Court in anticipation of
a vacancy. Historically, this has occurred when a Justice notifies the President that he or she intends to retire on a date certain, or upon the confirmation of a successor.160 Under the
Qualifications Act, the President’s authority in this area would
be statutorily acknowledged to extend to anticipation of a perhaps remote, but certainly grave and not impossible eventuality—the killing of enough Justices to deprive the Court of a
quorum. Congress has the power to add to the qualifications for
offices specified in the Constitution, including Article III
judges.161 Historically Congress has not been extravagant in its
use of this power, normally limiting it to oath and bond requirements,162 but it has used it on occasion to specify more
narrowly ex ante qualifications for office on the basis of, for example, age and political party affiliation.163 Similarly, Congress
159. Keeping back-up Justices usefully occupied would in all likelihood be a
nonissue. Most or all of them would probably be federal appellate judges. With
the confirmation of Chief Justice John Roberts, eight of the current Justices
came to the Court directly from the federal courts of appeals, and it has been
almost a quarter-century since the last appointment of a Justice (Sandra Day
O’Connor) with a different pedigree. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 104, at 341–42
tbl.4-12; Oyez.com, U.S. Supreme Court Justices, http://www.oyez.org/oyez/
portlet/justices/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2005).
160. See, e.g., Nominations for Prospective Vacancies on the Supreme
Court, 10 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 108, 108–11 (1986).
161. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415–17 (1819).
162. See, e.g., id. (mentioning approvingly the statutory oath required by
the Judiciary Act of 1789, Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 8, 1 Stat. 73, 76 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 453)); United States v. Le Baron, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 73, 78
(1856) (discussing bond requirements).
163. 28 U.S.C. § 251(a)–(b). The current version of § 251 contains qualifications only with respect to political party affiliations; the age requirements of
§ 251 were removed in 1996. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L.
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has legislated ex post qualifications (or, rather, disqualifications) of Article III judges, based on, for example, disability or
conflict of interest.164 Thus, while the combination of anticipatory nominations and preliminary qualifications proposed in
the Qualifications Act is unorthodox, it is not unprecedented.
The Qualifications Act would require even less than the
CPR Act in the way of revision of the United States Code. The
Qualifications Act could be inserted in a single new section:
§ 7. Back-up justices; quorum – The President shall nominate and
appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, a panel of
no more and no less than nine Justices in excess of the number specified in section 1 of this title. Such back-up Justices shall take office
only upon fulfilling the qualifications for office specified in Article VI
of the Constitution, plus the additional qualification that their presence on the Court be necessary to overcome a failure of the quorum
specified in section 1 of this title due to the death of sitting Justices,
and with the condition that the oaths of office specified in the Constitution and in section 453 of this title shall not be taken until that additional qualification has arisen. Back-up Justices shall join the Court
only in numbers necessary to restore the Court’s quorum, and they
shall join the Court in seniority order on the basis of birth.

Like the CPR Act, the Qualifications Act comports nicely
with the rump Court’s limited intrusions on the constitutional
“one supreme Court”:
(1) Preserving involvement of active Justices in deciding
cases. Nothing about the normal operation of the Court would
change, and no one qualified to sit would be prevented from sitting. And in the event that a back-up Justice qualified for office-holding on the Court, he or she would be a full member of
the court with the privilege of serving during good behavior just
like any other member of the Court.
(2) Preserving the functionally indivisible Court. Only one
Court, the current one, would sit. The rump would be a rump
Court only in the sense that there would be individuals with all
the qualifications to serve save one: a seat to be filled under a
certain condition, but when filled, filled on the same terms as
those applicable to any other Justice.
(3) No Justice was compelled to participate in anything
other than the conventional en banc Court. Again, membership
would be the same; only the qualification would be different.
As with the CPR Act, so with the Qualifications Act, there
are grounds for pessimism about this idea. There is, of course,
No. 104-317, § 501(b)(1), 110 Stat. 3847, 3856.
164. 28 U.S.C. §§ 3, 455.
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the very strong likelihood that the back-up panel of Justices
would become just one more game piece to be manipulated by
presidents and the senators. But if that is a valid objection to
judicial reform, then the Founders should have thrown in their
cards back in 1787, or 1789, or 1802 at the latest. The prospect
of politicking is no excuse for inaction, at least when the playing field is government in a democracy.165 Then there is the
possibility that presidents will feel some pressure to nominate
back-up Justices for seats on the Court that open up in the
regular course of affairs as a means of underlining the fitness
for office of the back-up Justices in general should they ever be
called into service.166 Something of this sort of nominating pattern (albeit surely for different reasons) already exists to some
extent with respect to the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, four alumni of which are currently serving on the Supreme Court.167 But the fact that not
all D.C. Circuit judges make it to the Supreme Court does not
appear to have tarnished the lower court. Conversely, the
judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit do not seem to be suffering any loss of standing due to the
failure of any of their number to join the Court in recent decades. No doubt this is due in part to the fact that there are
more good judges than there are seats on the Supreme Court,
and to the many reminders that a failure to reach that high office is not necessarily a mark of inferior judicial merit. Witness
Henry Friendly, Learned Hand, James Kent, Lemuel Shaw,
George Wythe, and their ilk. Besides, a back-up panel of people
who would make good Supreme Court Justices is the whole
idea, so occasionally drawing from that source would make
sense.
More troubling is the problem of perceived court-packing
that could accompany a sudden and dramatic change in the
make-up of the Court occurring all at once and under one
President.168 Compelling the President to select and the Senate
165. See supra Part II.A.
166. See Moss & Siskel, supra note 3, at 1044. A fresh round of nomination,
advice (or should advice come before nomination?), consent, appointment, and
commissioning would be necessary, there being no other way to remove the
impediment of the additional qualification in § 7.
167. Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence
Thomas, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg were all judges on the D.C. Circuit before
their appointments to the Supreme Court. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 104, at
326–30 tbl.4-9.
168. See Moss & Siskel, supra note 3, at 1037–38; Continuity of Gov’t
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to review the nine choices up front and in a single panel before
the onset of a crisis should reduce the risk that perceptions of
court-packing could undermine the authority of a wholly or
largely new Supreme Court. Further, it is possible that the
give-and-take of establishing the panel would result in a body
that reasonable people will be able to view as balanced, especially if the panel’s confirmation proceedings demonstrate that
to be the case. If this is too much to hope for, the Qualifications
Act could include a political diversity requirement—in the
same terms as those already in place for the Article III Court of
International Trade169—as shown in the underlined addition
below, with the novel but necessary corollary supplement further highlighted in italics:
§ 7. Back-up justices; quorum – The President shall nominate and
appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, a panel of
no more and no less than nine Justices in excess of the number specified in section 1 of this title, not more than five of whom shall be from
the same political party. Such back-up Justices shall take office only
upon fulfilling the qualifications for office specified in Article VI of the
Constitution, plus the additional qualification that their presence on
the Court be necessary to overcome a failure of the quorum specified
in section 1 of this title due to the death of sitting Justices, and with
the condition that the oaths of office specified in the Constitution and
in section 453 of this title shall not be taken until that additional
qualification has arisen. Back-up Justices shall join the Court only in
numbers necessary to restore the Court’s quorum, and they shall join
the Court in seniority order on the basis of birth, subject to the overriding requirement that no back-up Justice may follow immediately
after a member of his or her political party.

The dubious constitutionality of the political diversity requirement has never been tested, making it an uncertain, if not
weak, reed on which to hang the composition of the back-up
Justice panel.170 Congress could address this concern by adopting a less concrete but perhaps equally effective standard—
Comm’n, supra note 2 (statement of James C. Duff).
169. 28 U.S.C. § 251(a) (“The President shall appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, nine judges . . . . Not more than five of such
judges shall be from the same political party.”); see also Star-Belly Judges, 5
GREEN BAG 2D 240, 240 (2002).
170. See Adam J. Rappaport, The Court of International Trade’s Political
Party Diversity Requirement: Unconstitutional Under Any Separation of Powers Theory, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1429, 1429 n.3 (2001) (citing Jamin B. Raskin,
“A Complicated and Indirect Encroachment”: Is the Federal Election Commission Unconstitutionally Composed?, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 609, 623–29 (2000)).
Indeed, the Court of International Trade’s political party diversity requirements may violate the Appointments Clause of Article III. For a discussion on
this topic, see generally id.
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couched in terms of “critical mass” or “balance” or the like—
that might well have a better chance of passing constitutional
muster.171
A formal diversity requirement might be thought to “over
politicize[] the Court appointment process, even more so than it
currently is,” thereby “diminish[ing] the respect for the
Court.”172 Granted, a specific political diversity requirement is
more heavy-handed than the conventional mechanisms for
achieving political diversity, and this approach may not be appropriate for broad application to judicial selection. In this context, however, it is a matter of unusual form following extraordinary function in the pursuit of a constructive and credible
response to a potential political crisis.173 More importantly, it is
the political impartiality and adjudicative quality of Justices’
service while on the Court—not an absence of politicking preceding that service—that commands respect and preserves the
“noble notion that there is no party affiliation of the Justices of
the Court.”174 Supreme Court appointments have been so publicly and vigorously political since the early years of the Union
that a causal relationship between a politicized appointments
process and ruination of the Court’s reputation would have precluded the development of a respectable Court in the first place.
Indeed, President George Washington, our greatest national
unifier and the only person elected to the office by a unanimous
Electoral College, made thirteen nominations to the Supreme
Court—all Federalist partisans175—and his successor John Adams added four more Federalist nominations.176 The next four
171. Compare, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271–72, 275 (2003)
(upholding a race-based admissions policy that sought to enroll a “critical
mass” of underrepresented minorities through an individualized assessment of
diversity), with Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 315–16, 335–36 (2003)
(holding unconstitutional a race-based admissions policy that automatically
assigned points based on race, thus making race a decisive factor and resembling a quota system).
172. Continuity of Gov’t Comm’n, supra note 2 (statement of James C.
Duff).
173. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 186–89 (2003);
G. Edward White, Justices & “Electoral College” Elections, 7 GREEN BAG 2D
387, 391–92 (2004) (reviewing WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, CENTENNIAL CRISIS:
THE DISPUTED ELECTION OF 1876 (2004)).
174. Continuity of Gov’t Comm’n, supra note 2 (statement of James C.
Duff); see also White, supra note 173, at 391–96.
175. See 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY: PART ONE, supra note 94, at 1–123; 1
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
1789–1800: PART TWO 601–854 (Maeva Marcus & James R. Perry eds., 1985).
176. See 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY: PART ONE, supra note 94, at 124–55.
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Presidents (Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, James Monroe,
and John Quincy Adams) placed seven men on the Court, all
fellow Republicans. More recently, the 41st President nominated only Republicans, and his successor nominated only Democrats. And every intervening President behaved pretty much
the same way.177 The Justices’ transition-game involvement in
appointments reflects the same sensibility. As the late Chief
Justice Rehnquist quite reasonably acknowledged on national
television, “traditionally Republican appointees have tended to
retire during Republican administrations. . . . And Democratic
appointees during [Democratic administrations].”178 In other
words, sitting Justices tend to select Presidents to receive retirement letters on the basis of political affiliation,179 a rational
and respectable reciprocal to Presidents who tend to select Justices to receive commissions on the basis of political affiliation.
In fact, insistence on an apolitical appointments process for
back-up Justices would be implausibly inconsistent with the
noble tradition of elected officials seeking to represent the interests of their constituents in the selection of powerful federal
officials.180 Finally, even if the modern Supreme Court appointments process has reached an apogee of politicization that
makes historical comparisons inapt—an environment in which
the major political parties engage in no-holds-barred campaigns
177. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 104, at 343–51 tbl.4-13 (listing all Supreme Court Justices and their respective political parties at time of appointment).
178. Tony Mauro, Rumor Mill Starts Anew in Wake of Rehnquist’s Hints
About Retirement, N.J.L.J., Apr. 9, 2001, at 9, 9 (alteration in original) (quoting Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist on The Charlie Rose Show (PBS television broadcast Feb. 16, 2001)).
179. Sometimes a Justice’s desire to serve as long as possible trumps the
inclination to return a seat to a politically compatible President, see supra
notes 153–54 and accompanying text, but that has not distracted either the
Justice or knowledgeable observers from the traditional importance of politics
in making appointments. See, e.g., MURPHY, supra note 153, at 493; Emerson
H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, A Modest Proposal for Improving American Justice, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 220–21 (1999) (commenting that the same traditions exist at all levels of the federal judiciary). This should not cause any lost
sleep. Retirement is a personal and political act, not a judicial one, as illustrated most famously in the case of Justice Charles Evans Hughes, who retired from the Court in order to run for President against Woodrow Wilson.
Hughes lost the campaign and later returned to the Court when President
Herbert Hoover appointed him Chief Justice, all without damaging his reputation as a great member of the Court. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 104, at 340
tbl.4-12, 364 tbl.4-17.
180. See Akhil Reed Amar, Games over Center Court, WASH. POST, July 5,
2005, at A13.
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to place their respective favored ideologues on the Court and
politically assassinate those of the opposing party—that is
hardly grounds for hand-wringing about the politicizing effect
of a formal diversity requirement. If the politics of appointments really have reached an unprecedentedly violent and rancorous extreme, then a constraint such as the diversity requirement seems likely to make things better rather than
worse.
The questionable durability of a back-up Justice’s appointment is troubling as well. Like the Court of International
Trade’s political diversity requirement, the understanding that
“the President’s constitutional power to nominate Justices for
anticipated vacancies is limited only by his term of office,”181 is
untested. It is, however, a sensible inference, given that a contrary interpretation would permit a sitting President to “encroach upon the appointment power of his successor.”182 Unfortunately, the federal government is most vulnerable to a headshot during a transition between administrations, whether that
transition is part of our regularly scheduled democratic programming or not.183 This is the very time when the commissions of not-completely-qualified back-up Justices would be destroyed, or at least cast into serious constitutional doubt, by the
departure of their appointing President. Assuming the validity
of this view, the Qualifications Act could also be expanded to
include a presidential transition sunset clause and ratification
option, as underlined below:
§ 7. Back-up justices; quorum – The President shall nominate and
appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, a panel of
no more and no less than nine Justices in excess of the number specified in section 1 of this title, not more than five of whom shall be from
the same political party. Such back-up Justices shall take office only
upon fulfilling the qualifications for office specified in Article VI of the
Constitution, plus the additional qualification that their presence on
the Court be necessary to overcome a failure of the quorum specified
in section 1 of this title due to the death of sitting Justices, and with
the condition that the oaths of office specified in the Constitution and
in section 453 of this title shall not be taken until that additional
qualification has arisen. Back-up Justices shall join the Court only in
numbers necessary to restore the Court’s quorum, and they shall join

181. Nominations for Prospective Vacancies on the Supreme Court, 10 Op.
Off. Legal Counsel 108, 111 (1986).
182. Id.
183. See John Fortier, President Michael Armacost? The Continuity of Government After September 11, BROOKINGS REV., Fall 2003, at 33, 34; Ornstein,
supra note 13, at 15.
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the Court in seniority order on the basis of birth, subject to the overriding requirement that no back-up Justice may follow immediately
after a member of his or her political party. The commissions of Justices who fail to qualify for a seat on the Court before the President
who appointed them leaves office shall terminate thirty days after
that date, unless that President’s successor ratifies their commissions
within that period of time.

Finally, the mechanical, age-based pre-sequencing of the
ascension of back-up Justices to the Court under the Qualifications Act could result in something other than the paretooptimal replacement of particular dead Justices, at least from
the perspective of the relevant authorities—the President and
the Senate. Whether one views the Supreme Court as a
“team”184 (the internal dynamics of which must be carefully anticipated and accounted for in the filling of every seat) or as a
market of “nine little law firms”185 (the competition among
which must be dealt with just as carefully)186 the anticipatory
selection and fixed sequencing under the Qualifications Act of
nine Justices to fill whatever seats might open up amounts to a
partial loss of the power to manipulate the Supreme Court
team-or-market that Presidents and Senates have traditionally
exercised. A Congress seeking to balance its interest in preserving this feature of the Supreme Court appointments process
with considerations of speed and certainty in the restoration of
a quorum of the Court in a time of crisis could look to a process
frequently used in the selection of arbitrators: the “alternate
strike” method.187 This straightforward and easy-to-administer
process is recommended by the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service for arbitrator selection,188 and has a long and
184. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Hugo Black and the Hall of Fame, 53 ALA.
L. REV. 1221, 1241 (2002); Thomas E. Baker, Why We Call the Supreme Court
“Supreme”: A Case Study on the Importance of Settling National Law, 4 GREEN
BAG 2D 129, 131 (2001); Richard A. Posner, A Tribute to Justice William A.
Brennan, Jr., 104 HARV. L. REV. 13, 14 (1990).
185. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, DECISION: HOW THE SUPREME COURT DECIDES
CASES 6 (1996); see also Felix Frankfurter, Chief Justices I Have Known, 39
VA. L. REV. 883, 901 (1953); Sally J. Kenney, Puppeteers or Agents?, 25 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 185, 220 (2000).
186. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Merit vs. Ideology, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 353
passim (2005) (discussing the difficulty of selecting federal judges).
187. See, e.g., Murray v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int’l, Local
400, 289 F.3d 297, 302–04 (4th Cir. 2002).
188. 29 C.F.R. § 1404.12 (2005); ELKOURI & ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION
WORKS 171–75 (Alan Miles Ruben ed., 6th ed. 2003) (discussing arbitrator selection and, inter alia, the use of the alternate strike method by the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service and the American Arbitration Association); see also Pirelli Cable Corp., Case No. 20-CA-30624-1, at 7 (FLRB Apr.
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distinguished history in jury selection as well.189 The parties
simply take turns eliminating one individual at a time from a
panel of arbitrators, going back and forth until there is one left.
That last person standing becomes the arbitrator who will decide their case190—an individual who may not be either party’s
first choice but is certainly far from being either party’s worst
choice. The President and the Senate could use the alternate
strike method to select from the available back-up Justices a
mutually least objectionable replacement for any particular departed member of the Court. The Qualifications Act could be
expanded to incorporate this approach, as underlined below:
§ 7. Back-up justices; quorum – The President shall nominate and
appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, a panel of
no more and no less than nine Justices in excess of the number specified in section 1 of this title, not more than five of whom shall be from
the same political party. Such back-up Justices shall take office only
upon fulfilling the qualifications for office specified in Article VI of the
Constitution, plus the additional qualification that their presence on
the Court be necessary to overcome a failure of the quorum specified
in section 1 of this title due to the death of sitting Justices, and with
the condition that the oaths of office specified in the Constitution and
in section 453 of this title shall not be taken until that additional
qualification has arisen. Back-up Justices shall join the Court only in
numbers necessary to restore the Court’s quorum, and they shall join
the Court one-by-one, based on the use of the alternate strike method
by the President and Senate as many times as necessary to restore a
quorum of the Court (on the first selection, the first strike shall be
made by the President, and that privilege will alternate between the
President and the Senate for all future selections), but if the President and Senate for any reason fail to restore a quorum using this
method within one week from the date on which the quorum failure
occurs, then back-up Justices will automatically join the Court in seniority order on the basis of birth, subject to the overriding requirement that no back-up Justice may follow immediately after a member
of his or her political party. The commissions of Justices who fail to
qualify for a seat on the Court before the President who appointed
them leaves office shall terminate thirty days after that date, unless

21, 2003), http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/shared_files/decisions/ALJ/JD(SF)-26-03
.pdf; Ann C. Hodges, Mediation and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 30
GA. L. REV. 431, 492 (1996) (discussing mediator selection).
189. Some commentators have suggested using a method similar to the
“stuck jury” for selecting trial judges. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Bad Judges, 83
TEX L. REV. 431, 482–87 (2004) (advocating use of a “panel-exclusion” method
to select trial judges). For more information about “struck” juries see generally
James Oldham, The History of the Special (Struck) Jury in the United States
and Its Relation to Voir Dire Practices, the Reasonable Cross-Section Requirement, and Peremptory Challenges, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 623 (1998).
190. 29 C.F.R. § 1404.12.
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that President’s successor ratifies their commissions within that period of time.

Other proposals addressing the issue of Supreme Court
continuity abound, from the creation of an intermediate court
of appeals to operate only in times of national crisis,191 to a
modified appointment process,192 to a judicial line of succession
comparable to the one already in place for the President.193 It
may be that Congress is not acting on any of these ideas, or
considering any others, because it has more important, or at
least more interesting or pressing, business to attend to. But
the current state of discourse among scholars and policy experts suggests that Congress believes that it is excused by the
Constitution from bearing any responsibility for addressing
this issue. That is wrong, because Congress does have the
power to take at least some small if untested and difficult-todefine steps, as the history of the rump Court of 1802 shows.194
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court is a monolithic entity, normally consisting of nine members filling nine seats—“nine over nine.”
Congress has the power to change the denominator of that fraction by legislating a smaller or larger number of seats, so long
as that legislation does not purport to dislodge a sitting member of the Court. Congress has the power to reduce the numerator of that fraction by impeaching a member of the Court in the
House of Representatives and then convicting him or her in the
191. See, e.g., Moss & Siskel, supra note 3, at 1042–47; Ornstein, supra
note 13, at 16.
192. See, e.g., Moss & Siskel, supra note 3, at 1037–38; Continuity of Gov’t
Comm’n, supra note 2 (statement of James C. Duff).
193. See U.S. CONST. amend. XX, §§ 3, 4; 3 U.S.C. § 19 (2000); see also, e.g.,
James C. Ho, Ensuring the Continuity of Government in Times of Crisis: An
Analysis of the Ongoing Debate in Congress, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 1049, 1070–
71 (2004).
194. Congress probably would not, and certainly should not, seek to hold
some Justices in reserve by imposing extra duties so burdensome that they
would leave no time to participate in the Court’s work except in emergencies.
Cf. 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 1216–17 (1802) (statement of Rep. Henderson) (arguing that requiring the Supreme Court to review all cases in which the circuit
court judges are divided would be too burdensome); CURRIE, supra note 64, at
226 n.201, 280 n.29 (discussing Justice McKinley’s refusal to sit due to heavy
circuit-riding duties). In any event, modern Justices could frustrate such a
maneuver using resources not available to their predecessors—law clerks,
computers, telephones, etc. See David J. Garrow, The Brains Behind Blackmun, LEGAL AFF., May/June 2005, at 27; Linda Greenhouse, Chief Justice
Won’t Return to the Court This Year, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2004, at A11.
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Senate. Congress and the President together have the power to
preserve a reduction in the numerator caused by the departure
of a member of the Court by neglecting to nominate, confirm,
and commission a replacement. When it comes to the membership of the Supreme Court, that is all the Constitution provides. But the April Act’s one-Justice Court that sat from 1802
to 1838 suggests that the constitutional mandate vesting the
judicial power of the United States in “one supreme Court” does
not mean that all Justices must always be permitted to participate in all permutations of that Court. The history of the Court
tells us that there may be room for useful and constitutional
maneuvering. Congress should keep that lesson in mind when
deciding whether, and what, to do about preserving a functional Supreme Court in times of crisis and over the long haul.
It may well be that the wisest course is to do nothing, but if so,
Congress should reach that conclusion for the right reasons, not
via a constitutional cop-out.
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APPENDIX
CHIEF JUSTICE ROGER B. TANEY’S UNREPORTED
AUGUST TERM OPINION IN EX PARTE HENNEN195
Supreme Court of the United States Aug. Term 1838 —
Ex parte: In the matter of
Duncan N. Hennen, on petition
for a mandamus to the Honble
Philip K. Lawrence etc.

) On petition for a man) damus to the Honble Philip
) K. Lawrence Judge of the
) District Court of the United
States for the Eastern District of Louisiana requiring the said Judge to restore Duncan
N. Hennen to the office of Clerk of said District Court —
Three questions arise on this motion —
1. Whether the Supreme Court have the power to issue a writ
of mandamus in such a case as that described in the petition. —
2. If the Supreme Court have the power is it also given to the
Judge of the 4th Circuit, by the act of Congress of 1802. ch. 291.
s.2. establishing the August term. —
3. Assuming that the court has the power is the petitioner entitled to the office. —
The public interest requires that the questions in relation
to this clerkship should be settled as speedily as possible, and
they must be finally disposed of by the judgment of the Supreme Court. It is therefore my duty to adopt any measure in
my power that will enable the parties to bring the question before that tribunal. —
The question whether I have the power sitting alone at this
term to lay any rule upon this subject ought in a matter of so
much interest to be decided by a full court, and not by a single
Judge. I shall therefore grant a rule returnable etc. to show
cause why a mandamus should not issue with leave to any person interested to move to discharge the rule on or before the return day, a copy of the rule to be served on the Judges and the
adverse claimant of the office, on or before the first of Novem-

195. The original document for Chief Justice Taney’s Ex parte Hennen unpublished August Term opinion of August 6, 1838, is on file with the National
Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C., Record Group 267,
Entry 27, Opinions in Original Jurisdiction Cases, 1835, 1837–1839, Box 1.
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ber next. — If the Supreme Court shall be of opinion that I
have not the power at this term to lay this rule, it will of course
be discharged by the court at the January Term. It is nothing
more than notice to the parties against whom it issues. It decides nothing and leaves all the questions open for the decision
of that tribunal to which they more properly belong. —

